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' The purpose of the'present essay Is twofold In the f ifit 
place#" our purpose will W  to emmine '$aftre»s theory of consciousness 
■as it Is presented in |^^iean^nipips..:of-4h^..i^ for the most pari# 
m  shall limit our discussion to this one work In order to show how 
Sartre’s «eh*egelegfoa! theory of consciousness emerges ffomvarious 
theories Of1 consciousness In Modern Philosophŷ  .As such# our inquiry 
will be historical*. In the second place# we shall develop the’basic.' 
problems'with which any theory of consciousness must deal* and# in that 
'Connection#, indicate the adequacy of''''various modern theories of con* 
sciousness for resolving those problems* |n. this m y  we shall point 
to several alternative solutions to problems that Sartre has neither 
considered nor adequately answered* As such# our Inquiry will also be
critical*
In the Introduction m  shall .begin with some brief accounts of 
theories of consciousness In iodem Philosophy# thus providing a eon* 
crete# historical background for our inquiry* In Chapter One we shall 
elucidate the problems that have arisen concerning them theories of 
consciousness* these" problems will''fee seen to fall Into several gen* 
era! categories with which any theory of consciousness must concern 
itself* Any solution to these problems offered fey .Sartre# or anyone 
elm# c m  fee called into question, in the light of .previously developed 
■theories of consciousness id which these problems were of primary fa»
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The background of our inquiry ©an. best' be established by trend­
ing .several accounts of consciousness that have arisen in Modern f%t~ 
losopby. In. relation to each other they can be seen to follow several 
trends' which we can later develop* along with the particular problems- 
■'that -each encounter©,,. 'These accounts are representative, not only of 
historical theories of -eensoteusness In-general* but of the type with 
which Sartre* -and any' discussion of his theory* must fee concerned, in 
f spite of comments to the contrary*̂  $»fir© does not philosophize In a 
vacuum* and our explication -of his theory of consciousness, 'does need a 
backgroundo
Cescartes -searched for the foundation- of' the highest.'' and most 
absolute certainty on which he could toss ito explanation of the whole 
of experience. To arrive at such a ground, fee discard© any conception, 
idea, or experience that might fee subject to the least doubt* He 
methodically questions everything in his experiencing -and thinking 
life and -exclude© anything which could be conceivably doubted?
ihat of thinking? ■ | -find here that thought Is an attribute that
t
belongs to me# ti alone cannot be separated f t m  me° I am, I exist* that Is certain* » « * I know that i exist, and I inquire 
what I m , I whom i know to exist*, * * ° But «ha.l then am ft. A 
thing which 'thinks* ' that is a'tbing tblnksf It is a thing' 
which doubts* understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills#' refuses# which also Imagines# and feels**'
I know that 1 axl-af i^eause I doubt# thus'the existence of conscious­
ness is the one fundamental principle of certainty that 1'cannot 
doubt, I cahoot doubt that' I exist* for to'do so would be to doubt 
.that I doubt# and this doubting is given as'Issuing from a self which 
cannot be doubted--the necessary .condition- for 'there to be doubting 
going on* 'It Is intuitively certain that f exist as consciousness.. - 
'It Is this indubitable consciousness-that'forms the'ground of a ca- 
' Homily deductble bodyof knowledge about the world which is univer- 
sally valid* 'finally# fer'lbsearies# i Wtbaf which thinks* doubts* 
.and'so for ft,'and that-.whose existence does not depend on anything 
except.' Itself*
Leibniz’s theory of consciousness- arises out of one trend that.
' can be-' found in iescarfee# namely, that there Is m  underlying ego. 
which is actively involved in unifying individual conscious acts'
' Into an identical self* Lelbnlst thinks of subvenes as forco* dhltih 
is essentially immaterial* the spatial forms of substances are 
effects of this force. He calls 'these substances monads# each Is an 
independent being, 'different from every other one* whose changes pro­
ceed from an internal principle, «fhe passing condition, which in-
iBescartes* fifed Hat ions on first Philosophy* trans* Haldane ..and ■floss (2 Vols,j Cambridge* University Press*. 1911}* Vol. I pp.* 16!«
m f its.
%
wives and represents. a multiplicity In the unit of in Ilia simple 
substance* la nothing .hat what is called Perception*'** There la In 
each monad the same contentj each la a mirror of the universe* The 
difference between them Ift their mode of' representing this content*
All monads have representations! and those infinitely'smalt parts of 
the representative life of the monad ere called wpstiis# perception#*« 
'Wist distinguishes the monads Is the clarity sand distinctness with 
which they represent thelf Inherent content to themselves* "Thus It 
Is sell to make distinction between nereaoii* *̂ which Is the Inner 
state of'the ien&d representing outer things* -and apperception, vtvich 
is consciousness m  the reflective knowledge of this tim er state*"2 
ft Is In apperception that the souls* those monads which have some 
degree of distinctness In their perception, are aware of the' repre- 
sentat!one as belonging to themselves* Apperception Is a taking up of 
the- "peiiies perceptions” Into self-consciousness* This self** 
consciousness culminate# In God* who I# pure ##lf*co»#0'io»#ne#8«'
'There Is universal harmony among the monads because -each, one ha# the 
same content which It ml!*## |n varying Agrees of self-conscious* 
ness* Thus, only In so* far as i am aotively apperceiving the inherent 
representations am I conscious of myself a# existing* A# a soul* I am 
continually having perception#! yet* it i# only as they become clear 
and distinct* and as I become aver# of them ..a#- mine* that I can be
Leibniz, The ionadology and other Philosophical Writings, tfans* 
iatta (Oxfords ClarendonPress, 1896)* p* £24*
%elfeni% g||** p» 411*
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Mid to 'cppcrteiv© tttew# :
would #wt agree‘with hoibhfe .til#.«»!*.#« .
that animate and'other lower fam'of’tiffe'dsn perceive ideas* ■ -¥m  
$**©af'tes, to be e«oto«s: ©f 'te' Ides also §«©tedst. the possibility of" 
teaming «saf# of it* ttet 4 %  -to view II at belling to the self*. 
fceffenii holds that m A »  '®m ta ©ieritesf t©:tei«al% and that therd Id
*5
ft©. necessity for ait idea which is,©oty per«*iwdr M  In the ©as© ftf «* 
telmat, 'ifr-be possibly raised ■ to telf^^teloyteote* lfefld»» .tetmafs 
do not ©pperdeloe their perceptions, Pereas mm mm* Ifen m n make 
his Ideas 'tbs object of a farther sot# and In this, way
■ 4few -«nd develop the ratIteaf ■ solsftoea*- - . ; .
fhlsvdlffer««^ bsf«s©ft,-::ie«rtss-wid' bsiinls. can he seen sgalis 
to their stews tenosfhtng the- ̂ |»atees##f ,lltb©ugb they
. both held that man bad innate l#ss,. I^lbott ■ alsô  as^'tbsd tht© to 
animals and any other monad fiat had a soul* Locke challenged Leibniz 
'and issoaftss In - respect to this* as we .shall' w * A  by denying .that m  
haw© any lunate Ideas' at ©11* l#lte|s m $m f® 4 him l*i- 'toe l̂ ,:Iteava.
' oa..-Ate-.Jltederstaodte# by «s$iatftlng'th*t steh monad -has'all its Ideas* 
properties, ■sod. s© forth within It* although they are .not always «»k 
plfelt*. ft'is only $# «gp**9hptt0n 'that the Ideas ers-btou^it to 
l̂f*'Oong©fi«sft@ssf they may'm m  to-Mate #©m without, although they 
really are only mad© ©wre ©leer ted #st|«ot*
In ©tetfasi -'to tslbhfa* Locke 'held 'that the mind Is * blank
'-jfi.K 1 I'M ■J,iajnefrwmIfpi«ipwini>©?i»n d.uflWn' uĵ r<;n jWifj jm'»oruw(■ Jtiftm;*tn|-i: I,jf.eiriw ini.fîu-iTiHTriw>»i I ip Iinonfij !-mWi.h:>i>iim fiîcteyi|i»wi«rwi
. *below, p*S*.
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ofoor.felf*;, ©efl3sailo% fmsenifig, ;0f: thinking, m
00. copseteua; to ©uraatvest of ©or,own feet-agf a«dt.-.ift ibi© wifi©t>
, come ,;*jo$ 010% of ffvr fetgbati dagfe© of certainty ffet©. affirma* ■ 
tfpft.ats© aottvltlaa.tf the mini,
W i t o
have oo notion of tfie,.©«!fit©o©® of ,the -spirit, or soul* #®tbar «§s
ixisienee or not, , fhl§ ambiguity I© tafesm -over 
© 8©o«tg©i©gi©©i' oofeeejation of .©©©©©lousne©©*
a s  |1
•:... Hume -declared that ail the porcopttOh© of .the h m m  mii&4 0 0
©liter i©ffe©s|oiis 0  I dm®*.- for every siffipl# ttea ftere i©.©;©'
impression whichff for: every simple iia^galop there
i© © oprre©p©tt#«§ ttea* ■ fte -I-teas ar# ©opl-es of" the tiĵ etettea* s 
are lost lively; ate-dlatlholb. ■ it- haw to tiaa of -a self at; 
itentloal throughout ;tte ©our©© of oof.
y ll̂ rettioft .giwt ft*#', to the iuea m  s m i ,
-mutt continue invariably the © m ^  thro* the ;#*ot# course of. our
llveai It ©#pot*4 to ©©lit. after that ©sawn©?*
them'l©: .no,
o n $. vs© can onl a
smuoo
J  4 0 0 0 / 1  p »
M g g
different perceptions In a perpetual flm  m i movement, with no sim* 
fifslty or Identity -to -be 'found* * ‘̂Identity %  nothing ‘realty belong* 
log fe/iheae dll̂ renifMifdeptleftS# m i uniting them together.; but is 
merely a quality* which we attribute It the®# because of the- union of 
their' Ideas in’the lmagimtle% when we reflect upon ifaa*«i It Is 
only In'reflection‘and memory that spy identical.self'can be diacov* 
ered. Through memory m  Can wm the resemblances of the previous 
:dlsi|«Of perceptions and draw 'them togetherj their resemblance is not 
a relation that 'can be observed by the . "As memory
alone acquaints us with' the. continuance and extent of this succession 
of ’ perceptions#. *fls to be eensideied* upon that account chiefly* m 
the'Source of .personal identity*'■* . » Memory does not SO much §gt*
' duce as discover paraanat identity* »2 From the immediate .relating 
done through the memory we m n extend'©uf notion of -an identical - self 
to past end future tine# Of our ̂ duratlon that m  have forgotten or do 
hot antiolpate explicitly* The only connection we can' discover tee*
■ tween the septate impressions Is a feeling that -they are. united* 
but-on the level of philosophical Inquiry no personal ’ self la-diseav* 
orati* there are.‘only distinct perceptions* with distinct existences* 
which have no real connection*
As can be'seen#, Hume m m i Id the extreme opposite view* with 
respect' to consciousness* by holding that there is no personal self* 
'Tbit ..position arose from. the cons I derati ons of beete^e discussion of
 ̂Ibid* „ o* 260* %|iS>* PP* JMKUaWfc*
substance. ' Lock1 was quite willing to allow thfct there' is no materia! 
substance in which the ©bser¥bd:“̂uali.tie©'Inhere*'but ha-m»-iwk will­
ing to assert that «e**tai substances does not exist * It ia this lab*
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. ilth Humes few fetieves that .memory fees not produce aperma*- 
:00ftI setfj however* feiddoes not believe ihatihe seifwhieb is dia* 
covered 4m® not .fetfer* fe.hattavea .
-flute: the to| §. simultaneously, provides ...evidence: for Its existence*.
:J* .ftffe'.te eortelft. that ill am telt  that was engaged |ft the
renumbered event m,-m «fst- that Iheeveni took place* . Otherwise we 
: would-he -left with Hume's implied posit ion •that this succession of 
ideas and ; impressions not only remembers and fa eoosdfmia* trtlt that 
' lt/Judge%-'-feesofts? that-It eats end dr inks and
, Is-sometlii?©# marry and- w am & im * ,fed»0l: feld flute' .that, a ,per«s«ftt - 
,g©lf-is: a- necessary- condition for. there- to fe a, succession of mental 
■activities igolng ottf, lt,ls,ft̂ fed,fdr--tfe»/tô fe and
: aof©.:iflfortantly* .for there- to- t*. consciousness. of tfe activities ;SS
■feionglftg- to-a self* i: In this.-way- fefd. Imp! ieiily anticipates Kant 's 
. conclusions* .itis-fent mho. .carries, out:fefd% insights; and radically 
answers Hume's extreme conclusion* stemming frmr.toteiate fieseariea* 
■feet-fees. this, by showing the necessity..for. cofMOilviftg;a self which 
.Is Iteottcal throughout a multiplicity of mental acts#
According to feiti* the manifold presented to the senses te.eap#* 
rienced as ordered In space and time due to. Hie -p1 priori forms .of 'per* 
caption* These perceptions■ are unified .through' .the- § :i>Eiorl categories 
unferstanding#- ■ There arc a priori condi tions for all: o*peri* 
once which are synthesised with,the material of perception*;a synthesis
•hhtd** p* m .
I
s
f
II
I
s.
 
§ 
r
I
1
* 
I
1
|e»*|W8p|»̂|©s « p0|ef5M «• wee $t« «| pwe s§ 
8*eUSftO;$StrfOd |0 B|0» |BrtplAJjStt| #||| UJ |,| t% *£{»»'
; ■; °sn 8| 94©9dd© || «v pf,m <n$ jo agpspAoû $p|©ivC ,fm$|
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?he pure sciivltyof lb#. % &  is, therefore* now as was required,
I be cause of the objective activity #f -the.-lgo* sine© no object 
, .can be posited without it# . so far m  this pore activity 
drigihalty vp#n no objecb— both, therefore, being ,■'..... mutually independent of the othef^tt id nit ifs^eause, feet'.fe*
■ lated 'to it %  m ateolvt# act of the fg©**
if is this self^maoldusnetfe, or;oonsoto«sness which knows that It Is
itself acting, that is the basis # #  all consciousness! In fact, ell,
' Being'enisle'-only for’' consciousness which Is self^ni^ioueness*
there Is m 'Original act of ■<»»eciiMî ess' In dhtofe 'the -Ego 2 It
posited fey ■ feeing' distinguished ifm- the' noMlg©*' The fg© -end the. non**
Ego reciprocally determine each other*1 MBoth the. Ego and Doo^gt. .are
■products'of original acts of' the Igo* and consolousnets'it»lf it
■such a. product mf the first original act 'of th©'Ig®f ©f'ftie positing
' of'the Ego through Itself* «3 Knowledge, on the side of the. non-Ego
, • /
. Is' a ;process of reflection of consoioutneis 'm lit own previously de*
. ‘terwiioed actional beginning with lh© groundless free activity -of sen- ■
' satlon," which determines, all knowledge as regards content*' 'isnsa* ,
tion can fee comprehended only through '.its end,'that is, iff an inves*
■ ■ ligation1 on the side of the %o*": tore we f ind that If is the nature
of the tge to fee. ahnyi active and to set objects for Itself* :ti?he po
pure, self*ret«rning activlty'cf :the;!g® is*' :in̂ Mk..il^laiMte.Jo,A .
' "'.no^ifels ob ifecf* a tendenovi and*'' according' to the above, an;' Infinite
" "  ' ■ w  . . . . .  - ■ ;
•*   ̂;wrr7, Jteintiw vswa-o mwerjBt. ■ urcf. cbquh rw» n n rt uir<i w ,  î nf nj ;;i no nitwirfejt mqri's yrr l >!»w i ! f twpmais m.u t ■■i.rynnieiSi ni«npj)itivMii>itî  .■
■.. Iflchte, ■ Science..lof....feaWl.e.<fee;* oI $$& ' ■
because of ..the homophony of **lw and Keye,* wherever possible m 
shall use the word' %go* instead of’ the word *-M Wherever ,#f« and «eph are to fee dtsiinguIshed, m shal 1, -of- course, use the word «|v*
% < * » « » »  ■$t&- £ & & *  P» W h
I 8> m m 
. **
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s
i*anqp «m spusMf <rn, tpiq*
- y.| ttwisrit|0S!'s4» 0 X^M(| « jtg>f*ae» *eit sn $&*$
*ss®u3nc jOsuQo jvK̂'- ttail#!©!# 
JW9 *X(3A!|0®d334 '̂gq* uf: 43*410 ®l||
'wvgf «»f. is 'luff**® M4©f>Q$ uf 6p»Mf Syt̂iyuoa
«l feAttt m *Bujag n« punoaS  ̂ti ssauenopsuao-̂fasj
4#Si«ii&#0 * t«ttfiftd|dsw»'m' ®**f' &}' saauenepauao jo ■ X̂ioaq̂ 
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--It* other phenomena m  %  conclusion- grounded either-m  %he resemblance 
in a- fdndswntal respect* or on the- eoRtinttily bttfcfvtfce of the
■phwsitta seared**!'''' This df'.
. tie#* of per tonal Identity simi-ltsf to fta#* even though-.tueb an eeeouiil
leaves out many of the more subtle aspenla of consciousness* Gommon
sense requires that there must 'fee more of a unity of' various %©1vse
-'than Just 'aft apgMMtireoeft of continuity or resemblance that only be*
cornea apparent upon reflection on the past*
411 'the tno«frnlisns!bilitlos; which In Ohapter VI we mw to attach to -the idea of things, fusing wi thout a medium apply to the. empir* 
lolst'dssorlption w  personal l^ n tlty *
• ■ Butr in our own account 'the medium Is -fully assigned* the 
herdsman is there* In the shape- of something not among the- things 
collected* hut superior to m o  all# namely,- the real*- present 
onlooking* remembering# ’judging thought* or identifying *sect|on# 
of the - s f .......
James distinguishes -the-, no#' for- two types of - col looting thought* 
■X itai--which collects at awry: phase- -of :oonsol©iisness: that, which be* 
longs .to- -it#-and :g- that which -oslleots--these various collectings Into
* unity - that- t«' i&ftttti&t throughout the entire stream of thought* fit 
-wants to show that there Is no'need for the latter type ©f collecting 
'thougbt/in'S ■descriptive account of-consciousness-sinos the present
• judging Thought3- ctsild Is  said 'to'pass its‘fhoughis: m- to-the next
H im  Ism Jaws# The. Principles of Psychology f i  fe:Is*j. $©w Torhi
i-ftenry holt and '
•■ ■ % i d » 4 -p* .  m * .  ; ..
%e w ill* with James# refer to the present menial state which 
does the collecting as the Thought# with a capital f* .particularly 
when, speaking of James* theory of consciousness*
IS
pulse ©F cognitive -censcioM-ShesS* /%*rib tatef Thought, knowing and 
Including' thus the thoughts which- went hsfor%' is ihtt final receptacle 
~-stnd appreciating them is the final Qwmr~~of all that they contain 
. and f#» this m y each 'thought la tho representative of all
;fhot^ht# that- wit on Mtafftf add a personal; idcjntity Is ©slab I ished*
-Si rm  «®eh- paaslng-'fhetigihl cannot isilaef- Itself as a member of 'the
/group of known objectŝ  ft cannot bo know until-it passes to the
past and is appfepri&tsd Itself as an object fey the following puls©
of consciousness, ‘?b© present puls© 'my be afef© t#. feel I iself, hut
it can only know the previous pulse©! :it'can haw them as its own and
.therefeyallw for a consciousness of personal identity throughout-a
a e r i e s  o f  p a s s in g  T h o u g h ts * '
the of ’"Saif Involves a stream of thought, ■ ©ash partof vhleh as **lw can If fsmsmber those which went before, and know the things they kmw; and mpkmtm m i mm. paramount!)? for certain ones mwig the®' as %»## .mi appropriate to these the
'$S M * >  ,P * 5 3 9 .  
^ M d .« p. 400.
CHAPTER m
$ m m  0 m  mmim Ptmjm 
0  m m « umm pwieosophv
We can new sketch some of the problems that form * historical 
background to Sartre1® theory of consciousnesso There appears a speo 
■trim in which two contrasting trends stand Out*, On 'the. .one. hand., we 
find a nan-egologioal theory of consciousness which culminates in 
Ttane* On the-, other hand, we find an egologicai theory of conscious** 
ness which is best seen in liUiam dames* By an egologieal theory we 
understand a theory which holds that an. ego is actively involved in 
the formation of a self which Is constituted m  identical throughout 
a, multiplicity of -mental, acts* By a non**e§®loglcal theory we under­
stand a theory which holds that mental acts are not unified by an ego, 
although .an identical self may be felt to- unify these- .separate acts, 
or at least be the tests of them, 1# shall readily acknowledge that 
most theories fall somewhere in between these extremes, but. they can 
la test seen in light of these end points*
In his examination of mental life, Hume found that since we have 
no one impression of a self which remains identical throughout all of 
-our mental acts, we cannot have any legitimate Idea of such .an. ego*
If -we inquire, as philosophers,-. Into- the nature of our-' idea of a self 
we find that it arises in memory as we conjoin the various individual 
perceptions that resemble each other, with respect to tte perceiver,
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ion on myself. I never ©an peFOsiv© this self without some one or wore 
.perceptionsi.not' ©ait .|,ever psrcelvo any thing hot.the perceptions®
, *?ie the composition of these, therefore*, which.form# the self®"1 
, ■ Ml that, ©an, he found is,a,■pelf which It ©opposed, of distinct percep­
tion# that resemble ©teh-otherf. no real connection is found between 
; the distinct perception##
the be©I# problem: In,-Mem©*# theory Is.how to ans^r.th© ohjeo* 
, tion of Reid* "But who is the. Jt that ha# this memory and conscious-
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as
tinei percept ion a taking over of all that had gone on before* There 
would be a simultaneous remembering and perceiving at each moment of 
consciousness. However, Hume would probably not want to say this 
sin©®, he thinks of tsmmry as discovering identity and not producing 
it* Hum© does my  that ”The memory not only discovers the identity, 
hut also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of 
resemblance among the perceptions*1̂- However, this is not to say that 
memory produces in the sense that it continually gathers the past per­
ceptions together to- form, a self ; rather It I® because of memory that 
<m can hold onto the distinct perceptions and discover the resem­
blances between them that give- rise to our notion® of an identical 
self that is present throughout the perceivings* - Thus, memory produces 
personal identity in the- sente, of putting forth the perceptions that 
©an be seen a© related* . Hume- argues that memory discovers.personal 
Identity because if it produced It then we could not extend our notion 
of personal identity beyond our memory, as m  do through the notion of 
causation*
M  having once acquire this notion of .causation from the memory, 
m  can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the iden­
tity of our persons.beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, 
and circumstances, and actions, «Mch we'hsye entirely- forgot, but 
suppose in general to have existed*®
The' self that is discovered is not a legitimate self apart from the
*Hume, og>. ©It** p. £61*
®A ’'notion;*’ as opposed to an Impression, is not a perception of 
the human mind; it 4s produced by the Imagination*
8ibtd.. p. sen*
to
perceivingswhich can-be discovered, at least hot Jo philosophical 
inquiry; rather memory serves ■ to .discover the relation between the 
various perceptions* .- This relation la Itself not an impression, hut 
a  n e t t e n *  ■ . ■
In any mm* there .remain® the problem of explaining %hatn re*
fleet lyeiy Inquire® • into. the perceiving* In ■ ©eafehing far a 'self#• ■ As
t type all that can be said.Is. that 'there i© typing going m$, .It. Is
only upon further reflection that t can-Say that It Is'the. same self'
that is new typing as It » $  yesterday* ■ In feet., there must be a re*'
fleetly©, synthesis is conjoin the perceivings of individual key-tappings
to see that a !tselff! typed the word %©lf1f* €jyf problem,. as «  Mume-te,
Is to teeevnt.for this synfh@siu.ing activity, ■ Perhaps this can be best
Illustrated by. dames* character I tat ion of what be calls #|h© Psydhoio*
gtet*s fallacy*1!.
The psychologist, as we remarked above, stands outside of the ■ 
mental he speaks of#.. Seth itself and its object are objects for 
him* Now: Wien If Is a cognitive state (percept.' thoughts concept, 
etc), he ordinarily has’no other way of naming .it'than as- the 
■ ■ thought, percept, etc,, of...that object* he himself, meanwhile, 
knowing the■ .seltesswe object In his way, gets easily led to sup* 
pose -that' the thought, which. f@ of It, knows It In the ©awe my -In 
whichjh© knows it, although this'Is often •very'far from being the 
.ease*’--.' ■ ■. • T
ft Is •-In this-way 'that dames goes on fo.speak of-writers such as Hume
smuggling in a "weM or -a %indw 'that does’ this collecting,, but which
does -not come, under the scrutiny of philosophical inquiry, Hume does
not f'lnd a self In the distinct perceptions that he Is considering
l*te«©s, Psychology, I, .p* 136*
and, therefore, eoncludesthat there is no self* But he does speak of 
the.*w»* that .does, the reflecting*.:
Be Id mm: this problem and tried to show howmemory implies a
personal; identity with undoubted certainty*,.
f; see evidently that identity supposes an uninterrupted continuance of existence, that which hath ceased to-exist cannot he the same with that vWbh afterwards begins to exist,, for this would, fee- to ' suppose, a, being to,'exist after It ceased to-, exist, and to 'have -had existence, before It. was produced, which are man if©si con trad i c~ 
tions.1 : ; . :
As tie haw seen,® to tBmemhsf something distinctly to to believe in i t
as having taken place* and, moreover, as happening to,- or as an. active' 
tiy of, the person doing the rMsemberingo Memory, thus,, gives evi­
dence of a permanent self# *% thoughts, and actions, and feelings 
change every moment— -they have no continued, but a successive exist­
ence#. but that self or g  to-' which they belong; is permanent. held Is 
answering Hume by saying that 'it is’ absurd -to think of a self remem­
bering southing that did not occur in his. mental processes.* hot. 
only'did' It occur' as his* but It occurred to. a -self which ted -a con­
tinued existence from then’until now. In contrast to Hume, field he* 
lieves that the self which memory gives evidence of. is a feel self# if 
is the' self searching’for the. self as well as the one found. As I am 
-engaged in ■ typing. 1- can reflectively consider myself as the one who 
typed yesterday and who then reflectively considered himself as going 
to be' typing tomorrow, thus the self who Is now ref lecting can see
_ *Reid, gg. cit., p. 802. 2AbQve, pp. g».§#
%§ld* op* cH#* p» 203.
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that he fa  identical, throughout tfo y&Hous m t,fa l m fa  which ere seen
m fe ta#  , . , ,
fafa is it not only * seeing of a previous identity supposed to 
Ins jdeotleal with" the one who. is reflecting? for held II Is a matter 
of the evidence of memory, however It m y  b»; that there Is a. differs,. 
ence tetween, the'self' which does the remsmbering, and- the subsequently 
remembered self seen as Identical with the j5fev|ously?r«ei»hered'self* 
There'©an'be m way of ■«foeek$ng Aether or not the attribute of self 
is addedin the reflection upon the remembering process itself# since 
each process itself'feezes an object of memory* ' If i think of my act 
of typing, it is seen as j, who was typing, yet at'the' time the set 
occurred I m i conscious .'only of typing going’on* ’ ices it not require 
a ' further act: in' reflection to see' tblft as my act of typing? ' ft not 
this further' act itself without -an ego? Perhaps m must revert hack ' 
to tM' Humean theory where the relation Is only found after the deed, 
and is -theh attributed to the whole of mental life*
If' the 'objection holds' that m  only find an ego after the dis­
tinct processes are reflected upon# then we must explain how the: men­
tal process «dt reflected upon is joined to’ the ones reflected upon in 
#ifch'a» ego appears* In other words, It may be the case that an ego 
'•eah,only be found i f  the- menial process inwhieh It'appears is re- 
flected upon, but our problem is what "happens In reflection that al­
lows''an 'ego"to arise where there was not 'one before#, there are many 
times that-I have been typing, during which# or even after which# I was 
not conscious of an ego engaged In typing# ‘to- be sure, 1 can -now say
88-
"that ft m s  1 « s  %pi%#;bdf the'relation tatawtt the
processes which did not. have an ego give© and the same ones which 
were subsequently. found 'to- have on ■ spf .: $cw» iM# imply that every 
.menial act baa;#© implicit eg© ■thai'©nly:#e«|«lres a farther act i©. 
articulate the first' act m  having e*rag©t ft «ay'feevfhaf there Is a .
part ©f that la-©o«l loyally engaged im-.
balding together all the mental art© that can be -s#e%- in reflection#, 
as being gg acts* The distinction that would he required in this ©as#
Is m@ that bath ham® and field did'net « w t but which they felt to be 
theres each mental act is not always given in'its-entlretyi It con­
tains a 'quality ©f belonging to an eg© that Is only available when 
It' I# made. Into an object, 1 may type for. hours without thinking of 
this typing as tMsionglng to. an egor yai# ties# distinct sets of' typing 
ar#..continually#' and automaticallyt binding ihofflsolves 'together1 In ; 
such a m y  that-1 can look at them and say that, they are fine,"
tilt tern approaches 41# problem of accounting for the r«S*»
tion between the distinct fMMti&l acts m 4 the self which unites them 
by distinguishing tti© types of collecting thought# There is the type 
of thought that collects at-©very moment of 'thought all that belongs 
to ity and that which collects these’various collections Into a -unity 
that' la identical'"throughout the enttr© siraaro of thought, James wants 
to dispense with this latter type of oollectlog thought as feeing super­
fluous and unnecessary to any account of consciousheaa,.' As-b# have seen#*
e>#wi#ieia<»»eaj.ii»' w ni ki.dri ji.i f. fj ,ii>iew^ua^pwe»ewiiaii© e r# j^ ';̂ ; we'iju'i iii •# i urn ronef ^ H iWip n"i rnp i »freir r iriiy>np iiL ‘i iwiiri i.n ioirit'ti¥i^ rn i# iwii<ert» igtN»i .niiiwWf iia u iijiiinii ai' iij ciiiiii ■ !(j'tii~oi!iitiariWw#w'M>'>iwj ij»T'i^ taf ^ eja,iiiaio«ivii'wiii iniiiai;ewii» r.i len^w^wwiwwyiiii#
1Above# ppc IS-* 16,
he does this by considering the present juciging Thought to be appro* 
pristive of all Thoughts that have gone on before It* and as it recedes 
into the pact the -new- judging thought -lake# over all that/ the. past-on# 
knew* Ifr this way - we have a unity throughout'the individual Thoughts 
-becawee «U» Thought deem-not capture ihe% but m  m m  m  it comes 
into- a&lsTeoee it- f Inis them already its mm* Hew le: this-possible 
unless the Thought have a substantial Identity with a-former owner.*** 
not a/anra continuity er-e rasarablance* as. in m r a real.
dames does nbt want te.cernplimta the explanation of what 
is given It* otimwtatt*n*fc» and dees this;by- allowing' the passing ; 
thoughts the-ability to- recollect and to know. Tim* he-'Csai.'«<p,ialn 
#taf held called the permanent self# and what Hums called the notion 
of,personal Identity*-
daw«' goes on to admit that each passing. Thought* although 
appropriative of-all that has gons on before- it*. Is not itself known*
It-only:becomes m object for teowle<%e.after ii is Itself appro* < 
priated. The ego to- which the- Thought attaches the past Is*' for tfeaee* 
the bodily life that It,momentarily feels* 'ft Is-the-body ̂thai ferns 
the .real nucleus of our personal identity and "Is the physical, counter*' 
part ©four judging Thought# However* is not this ego#, either psychical 
or physical, only an empty 'Concept that respires a subsequent act to 
fill ft out as the real apt This-subsequent-act is- required for the 
non**reflective ego to be seen as. belonging to-the self which thought
d̂fewae* ■ oft* - felt*-* q»» $$8*
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ef fey considering A m 4 own theory ©f the "transitive” and §jibstsf*« 
live” part© of consciousness* iy substantive part©# dames means the 
kind ©f resting placet lit which consciousness t© ©espied with some­
thing that ©an. b® held onto far an indefinite length of times the
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©ah, see ihat the 'tfeftsiilftft "dews'-ttet. need aft to  make
'ttoftto|©fjmatai*' ''The eg# ftgftnot'fee observed'1« the transitive 
m m H m m rn & t to/It-'is fherei ’ttos'ls only ’rftcplfad a
■grasping -ft! :«ftftis#i®û ftsss as eubft^ttv* I® see the- ego* ■:
:; -that m # fry m m $ m ff$ ' Instead’ ft# ft pvta rnvw l ■*#» is "eh eNplii*-'
■ tolon about 'tbs ;wsy Sfteh'ftoghi can both 'ftelate alt- that lias - gftftft on
feefef%; and- still. jbt- able' I# seleet fre® the past apssifle-parts of It
■flat be ?e»«terto ■ In' other 'words*'' if there -is m. permanent -*g»
which unifies mil Ills iftdlvidtiftl thoughts there must fee some part of
each ̂ agtrt'that\rfttalftsrftll,.̂ r̂ iftfts Itoghtsf ■§<* that da®es t o
.apeak of -the ;pr«s»it 'Itoght. as ŝ lsfttiftg or 'rajsetlng ’sat^isl from
•what. has- gone' m  h#«f#t ■ ■.'
’ ;' fhafhftwght ’#tloh» 'whilst' it knows another "thoughfood the. $bjee# 
of Diet. Other* appropriates the tthef m 4 the SbJeel which ih©
.■ ■ $iher appropriated* la still a: perfectly disitisot pheftotoftft fro®INI ftfterf. It m f hardly resemble' Itf it may be far removed from ■ -it- la, space m i  tt®©*# 1 ' - ,
!tt-«ay fee that toes' mmti tot to'. employ W s  'totrioe. of 'fringes 'to
• -#plalit what we too :ftallftdl' the two ’parts of tosciowaneto. :ef ft# "the
Thought that seems :tft ’ ft*' totrioe ;of fringes 1% .for ■
dames, the theory 'ito-sUety- ihiftg to- a. fringe of relations about It*
Itiese felt fWftgfe* make us aware, somewhat dl®Iy*;Of relations between
' :tfee 'fringed thing t o ’ otto thlftgsf ■ a. ̂ elai|e% then to. our topie ■ ■
or Merest Is constantly 'felt in 'the’fringes m i  piriieulwly-Dia re~
lalioft'of'-harmor̂  and discord* of furtherance or btndtofte of the topic*”2
- .»to»itototoewto!dWir:»iHi'i*jWiii»«iaî  •
*JM4 *$ pv Mfi* 21feid«» p, m *
m
lii till# ©ay* wp to. top tiot o»*fc bjoefc m ft  I# ap#«pri* 
®M «r fojeotai lo. fotalftttt In th* fringes*'««£ tb t these frfegs® 
my he totogjbt w t at aay tfw# for taopooMoo* tM« a tltl t#a»i at 
«4tH t i*  mootim «M»ntbg tb  .imlnfe of lb  ftaogb Ib l la Ofcto la
■teM mb' l b  #t«g@ of ##$#tto»%'m tfco m o  tewi* m i  fe# oopltoitlp 
:km%mi. «iff* oorteift part® of thiap m i Ib lr  fotaUmo* o» lb
O&Mf bil#*
ftaro oaooi In aa iopttoft Mai In -dmo®* ttowfjr f* f muotMflfii 
Ohlcife faftate® btm gbvl ott of tb  ftaqMot ooootMtog tb t oobaab 
tootly w taiat a ll that too gone out Oofttfo «ni lo ass&ra* awl'«$&!«» 
lllf t  of fttoolf a® ooiftatf* ObaMoo® oo Mgr to otto to aap as
ttn® does that lb  og» I t  only ab b  «£$of #as§* ftw##ti itatttf to
opltfoprfotoi OAi iroloi at# If m  4mm t b  ii®itisatta% «* «o a w
< & « a  - -  -tiT r i i  f ?  g S t j a *  2 . « ■ $  ' O i  f W  ,|M A - i i f . v g  M l  tfifi- H ’frttr ii' I t '  H t t - a b ^ a i k  m #  tfftrft-filif ft lit A  M . J P  -  j i r i M C  J-i ^  ^  •tff'r i  i f i H i r  #ii I H  tiiiTO 1*1 fiMKfl© Oft® P»t% wOt©o©ft llsat psnfl #F m Of coeaoioussriaas
that bo® not afpoaff lb  ooimotio ontf toaltoot mi" that ©filch does 
mow*® oo asptfcfttf opffopfiaM or m  lb f¥lwgi«§ to «m ma bo
ftoMi mo tfffog lo ifa*rteg#ibr lb  tm twaf®, that m  fmod la oor 
fotMtiMtionft that 1% thooff «f ##»#i§iwi«#®# la -ogetogtaBi 
la lb  my that lb  pmow% j®*tgi«§ fboght mlfta® tb  gfwtouo 
Ihmgbt# lata a pommel w ltf* it#  ttwofy la ite m
b  does ml wot to t& tim  lb  oot'otonoo of a ptfmooot ago opoft ffm  
tb  lo iM bal fltGoghts* fill# 4tUono'of tfftffg to to bth ^olGg|«al 
ab' aoiw^ot^tel at fho o o  tlst giwa# »fa»«i tb  mlmo'fooltlod of
 ̂AGva-s p#
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deal with only the first and the %bird as we have already considered 
the second in connection with Hume*
the Soul la a simple immaterial suhstaoee '|n which the various 
operations of the psychic are grounded** -ft *0 m of whose
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holds that, m  do not have a closed personal m  a, ©dnso#
OuSfeee of 4my, 4$0s#6taP*p •fotfesi of Faetf. father, ffhe definitively ■. .■ 
■closed nature, of oof personal- .©enseiott-sittis !#■ pfftotab&y an. average ■. 
statistical: resultant of: many ModHtons^1̂  4 m m  kmUmm- to the ■ 
ptthtl̂ .ayallahtiity'Of:'.!̂ , SelfV which he think#' Is evidenced by the 
ftifnomen# of thQ|^Vtra^sr©»!e%;i»8seieris: and spirit
.COtttfeiU' .We tMs;.dfffers f¥§m the more traditional view# In which 
every person If .an. individual , evert, if all. persons are known fey a Gad* 
ft is doubtful that dames would ..wmi to go so far m  to say that each 
•psrsonrf :tho^hts sfa. avallafei#-to. atysne also, but this imp! ication 
. .would, sot vs, the; .problem,: of .litsfgufejsotivity without appealing to a 
m  m . iuslfenis.doss* ■. In .any case, many problems coassrning, the 
patwf# of: the jcmtAt&Mttft' off So fen. this connect ion, ■ such m  whether 
.-the entire self was, atvailiifete*. *$*?!*- 0f «elf does -the com­
municating,. .tahfob: #partt; ,1s and so forth* . .
. Although;sfewjss.has dtomm^ffeted that,the,Soul. Is.st̂ orfltiows.to- 
aft.afccuot'of;consclo»snossf. m  ego etll>--tahe. the wsoul theories** 
more seriously than dam©® does*; '.if we do ■that* then m  esoOwttfsr 
still soothsr;.principal problem* . this problem is first found is
iliepfy: in which he passes from the recognition that there 
I© doubting ■going'on to. a. bel ief to. as ego which doubts- Ibis ego,
wehtal':ilfe * Locke, tad, started' id-'the seme direct,loo, buihe soon
is conceived os ..the. n@.@essary condition 'for there to fee
recognized that the Cartesian ego could not he found in experiences 
even though 'he still retained the-' supposition that a “something.* I 
know net what’* supports individual acts of consciousness * it seems
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&?■!$:©$. soivserm'rig the nature ©f thlfe eh»gs* ’"Although in© monad is 
psychical m nature* m  roust still distinguish between the pelites. - 
perceptions. that is, Hb& Infinitely analI constituent parts of the 
representative life of the monad* ^  and the self which Is conscious 
of them* ttt being conscious of them and retaining them -|o memory, 
the monad seems to fee split into two parts*, Into that which k̂nows® 
and that'which does -not ’know,’* Thus we can see that It may fee pos­
sible that the self which m  w m  to fee aware of may fee constructed 
from the .oeiltes percentions m  they come to fee distinctly represented* 
Of It-may also be possible that the self which comes to fee selfWaon- 
seiotis is already aware of itself prior to ■apperception* In. fact, it 
m y b© necessary or else m  would have, to ■account" for the addition of 
something not in  the individual parent ions* that is, the self which 
is common to all these perceivings*
■tot o§ tom-'to da«e&f third classification* ih© Tr&nscendent- 
alists* From -our■previous addeunt of Kant’s theory'we found that 
Bft. must fee possible for the If. think' to accompany all of my repre­
sentations* The «I think® is the transcendental ego whose work can 
fee. seen in time as 'the transcendental unity -of apperception* ft Is ; 
conceived m  the necessary .condition, for there to fee an empirical ego 
in itee* although we can have no knowledge of the transcendental ego 
outside of •time* the first problem confrenting this theory 'is -the way
Iwindelband, A History of philosophy, tfahe* ffefts (2 Vols.j Mew 
York* harper and Brothers, 1958, If* p* 424*
%at*i* p* 182*. Above* p* II*
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in which the transcendental ego can fee outside of time, and yet fee In
time aa empirical* the Ofl-gin of the spati©temporal world is in the
transcendental ego* which is outside of time*
the M think* egresses the act of determining my existence*. Im  
isfenoe is already given thereby, twit the mode In which I am to 
determine this existences that is* the manifold belonging to It*
Is not thereby given* In order that it fee given* self**intuitIon 
Is required? 'and such .intuition Is ■conditioned fey a given a. or left 
form* namely* time* which is sensible and belongs to' the receptiv­
ity of the determinable yn we)*l
■the self is both outside' of time as the necessary condition for my ex­
istence In time* and is In time as It appears .to itself* 'time is tbs 
limiting factor in our knowledge of ourselves? time limits us'to the 
knowledge that we are and the. way In' which we appear*. There are im  
alternative ways of considering this problem of the relation between 
the transcendental ego- and' 'the empirical ego*
in- the one hand* If we take the phrase* %tust fee able to aceom* 
pany*® m  meaning that the BI think® accompanies prior to and apart 
from reflection* then It Is a reality which subsequent reflection I 
only reveals Instead of constructs* although what is revealed is only 
the spontaneity of my thought* ®t cannot determine my existence as 
that of a self-active feeing? all that. I can do is to represent to my­
self the Spontaneity of my thought* that Is* of the determination*®2 
Ai:...a.-gea.l.iiy,t the transcendental ego it an agent that performs- the - act 
of determining my existence* M  .an., .agent* the transcendental ego be­
comes somewhat'similar to the "Soul« dames describes as superfluous to
SB
any 'tk m m t of eaa$©Io«sfi©a8» ''ih-’thla OaM'-we are - led- back trth© pfof** 
l*t«^w:'oa#0«»|©ro4 In-the fhaoHea-©# fiesoartet 'Jtintfy*
By the individual wets of^ 
eoi^»«i»ea$: or'«fhafhtr ■■#»©■ «a$f ra^Iroa the Individual acta in 
which it can he grounded* ■ As an agent buialda of. -$$■* and- apace m i  
ina^soiBI# to «* as an-object of knowledge:, the transoendenlai ago'.-., 
.cannot'be aeon In Its .relation-'to our spatioiemporal world*
ffe the. -other'hand| if we'take the *1 -think** aranty- the- nooeo*- 
safy eondi Uon for ■ there to: le the world and-myself at I know them, ' 
m  m m i answer why m  need this In an explanation of: $gg consciousness 
Is -in. 'fact, constituted* ■ iy- considering: only what Is- presented to our­
selves in time we would want to know what takes ever the Aities'-of ■ 
unification of the separate acta -of' 'm ttm km m B m  m  'that we can fee-' 
-said' to- -fee conscious of ourselves* : ■ iy reiasftlhg ■ to-- the transcendental 
ego,- which la dftttntfally unavailable ;-tO' m $ to-explain on? e#lf*aetive* 
'm m  m i  m f ability to le-eonscimis of oof selves as spontaneity, m  
mmt*’ 'as Kant -tried- to do#-■provide a method that would make this tran*- 
scondenfaf. realm available :io -s®»: -fhi«- atoihod would have ft ho- apart 
■from ;Ju%t -logical consldfefatlofts,' If. m  -arc t# m sm v -the -̂ lest'-ion of 
How consciousness |s^lb-fact to be explainedt. ■ |#r any case* what- r@-- 
.wmiaO'.eofiftant. la 'ditf waaldafttUoft' #--ttess-alt^natlv© views of -fe*t% 
theory -4a - the problem of -how the.manifold given to #owe|.ougjn#sses - Is, 
■related ■ to ;cohscto»«sss- «e sy cwsdoiishass -and how-1 myself and my 
.world are related to 'an origin outside ,©f the world and consciousness* 
is can follow-the development of transcendentali sm froas Kant t#
1
&ft
%
ward fba cafflprehension of all-which fa-not the fgo* fiehte cone©Ives 
that it is the essence of the %o to be active and since it requlrat. 
an object on which ta act It,posits the t!an~Ego, the external world, 
in which tO' fe®-mctiir%,and in this way he gives Befoga secondary .
place to the Ego* This Ego I© itself outside of the spatiotemporal
that it :fjoaito itself -m acting 'In* ■ tbcs# ftchtii carries fent*© ecu-* 
eeption of the logical n©ee©af%■©# a-transcendental egoto the point 
where it is .pr imary'to■all being, not just the logical.necessity for
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§, In the, theories of Kant and Fichte in particular m  find the 
transcendental eg®, conceived as outside ef.time* This raises the prob­
lem of the necessityofan ©temporal origin ef our self and our world* 
If such an ego Is found *te be necessary then we must account, for th© . 
■feist ten. ef the temporal to the non-temporal 5 and the manner In which 
the eg© can .be both the origin;of -and actor In the world*
#*■■ the problem of accounting 'for not'-only memory, but th© fact 
that we forget certain things which we can subsequently remember 
©omes;up in all ,of the theories m  have considered. :f© can foe said 
to retain 'everything.and yet we- utilise and remember only parts of 
■this-4otaltty^parte'wh|^ :©tm«g.r©r ,are replaced by previously urn*, 
recollected, ones* This would seem to require a self which- is present 
throughout our mental life with, the-ability to remember all that goes 
on* This can be seen, particularly with respect t# dames, and as, we 
shall see, Ihrtf-©*.
f* , :fhsre is finally a basic consideration as to whether it is nec­
essary to view the world.m  n product of the self*, as that- which the
self finds Itself in, ©r perhaps as only ©©-original with the self*
In some manner or other this problem must fee solved, or at least put
in Its correct light. If we are to see what exactly .the eg©, and con­
sciousness, lie*
In the 'next chapter we- .shall develop an immanent critique of 
Sartre's theory of consciousness.* this.will form the basis, for work*. 
tog out and answering in terms Of Sartre's theory (Chapter Three) the 
problems we have raised In this chapter*
-«%§.Twr ■ 
, m mrnrn.m, o r  .
, mm pf
St sbal 1 limit ourselves in this critique t© Sartre*© theory of 
consciousness as he presents ‘It in his essay The Transcendence of.the 
|gg* it are hot' disregarding his other' studio#' of consciousness be» 
cause■they-are unimportant, rather we are excluding them in order to 
concentrate folly on this theory, which heat." show the development of 
■a non-ego logical theory of consciousness as' coming out of ftfodern Philo­
sophy,
in . fhe .gpo*. Sartre .makes the following 41 s*
tinctions «The ĵ 'ls the ego as' the unity of actions*'' "the ig 'Is the 
ego 'as the unity of elates and' Of qualities*Holding this distino 
tion in-mind we shall sketch'out' his theory of eoneciottswess* With 
Kant, Sartre says Hhai the i Think'must be able to accornpanyall our 
representationsoM However, this does not signify' that each conscious­
ness is accompanied by an H  Thinkjtt Instead*.''It signifies the MT Think*1 
can only' be seen in a further act of consciousness in which the eg© is 
constituted in'an act of reflection. T© go from what Kant regarded
. 5Jean-Paul Sartre, Ulmaclnaife (Paris, 194G)j tf£f.r© et le 
Heart! (Paris, 1943), ' ' ! ‘
%eat>-Paul Sartre* Ifep. ,.Iî niiaMidtenm.j»f Ah.e....f f©» tr«ne* fill lams
andKirkpatrick (Hew forkt»onis^ Pfesb# iiif), $*90*
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as a format condition far there to be experience at alt.to an existent 
would fee to falsify Kant, adding at the same tin# an'anj.ttstlflafel# 
character i® his eonoepi,  ̂Ifee problem .becomes statfief this eg© that' 
must accompany all our representations is made possible fey the syn- 
thetia unity of our representations* of whether it id the ago that 
.m m t accompany all our f«̂ fesentations** If we accept. fiisseri*# 'die* 
em ery that'.transcendantai eohseieUsneiss is. not just a''logical, condi­
tion, but a real, consciousness, then we find'that transcendental con­
sciousness const?, iute-s our empirical self and our world. fewever, 
Sartre*© problem Is whether this :iranwam)erttal spaciousness. Is neo- 
:essary for. an account of .consciousness* ■ wf# -not-tMd psychic and 
psyeh'o-physidai |gg. drsought 'feed on® double It. with a transcendental Ji, 
a .structure .of' absolute. consciousness?1*2
.: The question becomes; do we need a transcendental .eg® I© unify 
a«d individual im  all *y paraepilons 'fin fhfe Humean s m m }t Phenome­
nology, :|h@ method that fartfe says he.'l# employing, does not need 
such a .transcendental ego becauset
It Is.consciousness which unifies Itself, concretely, fey a .play of 
"transversal*' Intentlonallties which or# concrete and. real retention# 
of past ■Gm m im m m tm m * thus .consciousness refer# perpetually to 
itself.* Whoever say# %  consciousness" says "the whole of con- 
#oto«sn©s%.w',a«.d thin singularproperty belongs to consciousness 
Itself, aside from whatever relations it may have to the j,**
Consciousnesscan unify Itself 'fey perpetually referring to. Itself in a
synthesis of past and present acts of consciousness* In this way, con-
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nesses*** 'fk#ego* m  the hotly. ef doss :i#rf -appear -as■ Ih®
?^t©ete4 :« o « ^ i m i w i s s s e s s ' s s  ®$mFt from the pftHltteUf ■ «9nr**. 
seiousness through which the1 ego appears* •■ .
Seftr* #a«# fewf •-ise«el«@lw fra® his analysis- which *» can 
clarify*; i) It# tge -ef' * type #ki«h -effere It*
pelf as ■■£)■ H #  ego; offers itself ie aB'iftteliien'ff t* >
S^lal'kindy flie'ep!*i^®r appears omcpt to m  act of inflection*, 
end Is tbs trar#ss?iie#it abject''# tfatoetff'4) "fha transcendent ego
f ; Is ■ f tm  absorbed In typing I - sfe- not f i# this activity as be* 
'-longing'is-m dget* : #hen I do-tufa my wHahllat upon the ootlyity t V  
self ■'in' a ots%«: ■t#:-#iiWl an age appears a# behind the .
nefleetSd si9ns®|nttsn®ssi that i.% # #  agate esowaa bay ing a reai: 
#isisaos* ; although dtf?er©ni thaw'that ef & ogotî sî pstol̂ tNBiiiiĝ
■ that' is ti^sesndehf'' i# the -'Object' being confronted* ■ the activity #  
typing# ''the #r#oafrotation/-of if#ago hakes place on 
a .-level’ that-is :tre«tssftiti»t In both the ;rtfieeitng m i ih# fef teste#
■ oansstddssiesti" 'that is*:: the -ego is a tfanteenrfent oh jest’ apprehended 
jâ srt - fypj» the'activity of ■typing #i«b has -Its own ’Object- of. a- difW
a 'spatlbt^pdfat’ane» :tbe :l|p#rit@r*1 Thus, -In pn%. m®*
p., so. sAbove, p*. 58«
Ŝsftfe# gg» £&$** pp. #*SS*
 4cf. Edmund Husserl, Ideas 'irana*. Boyce SIbeen (Mew York I
tfecmlilan-, liSl j|. Sens*. JUt*- 1* ■ and 18*24 for a ?«tl©f account of the
tew *ihtsition«*.-
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consciousness (o f) consciousness. Iters la no ego, and, 
therefore., In the phenomenological reduction, which it an apprehension 
Of pare conaclottanosa# no transcendent ago appears*.
Qurwitsch e^prssat# what Isrtte It saying fey the following?
ihen a grasps sol sfifsart m  wwraweted with the ago* the tailor 
.presents Itself m 'maiming this act* In ftet 'ite eg© to wwmtete 
ed not only with the act (nipntimcni and grasped el the time feeing* fewt also with otter acts* even with m  infinite number of them,.anil II |s this way that the ego appears* It offers itself as.a pefwsnefti entity*' as eeteintting existing* beyond the grasped sot 
Which* like all mantel. steles* stestettflally perishing* The ego 
thus appears through ratter' than |te grasped ad.**
®S .can also use some tetter emanations. af Ourwi tsch to help as un­
derstand wfol exactly .Sartre Is talking. ate«i*^
ftera ate two kinds of unity in conscious life* fte on© Is a 
unity of mental steles In which the same object presents itself* But 
this unity of separated menial states is only a unity with -respect to 
the objects for example* each, time 1 remember a certain word* There is 
rn -ego required f Of there to fee these separated consciousnesses of this 
wbjeet* Ttefe Is anettef $yp* of unity# namely the watffcwttan of acts. 
i» -their duration* It la a unification accomplished, .as we have 
seen,3 fey a synthesis of past and present acts m  that conscious life 
becomes endowed with a stream character* this unity tees not depend 
on an ego, fatter the eg© depends upon the unity of consciousness.
Open reflection we might, find an ego* but during tte urvreflected
iAron SurwitSch, *»A Mon-egological Conception of Conscious­
ness, ‘I (1940), p* 333.
2ilM** pp. 328-330* % O V %  pp. 39-40.
of s&bbjddt of tie object
and, »afeoiMss that ’there -It ■cer»̂ sie«̂ ,*esê  - ‘ffe-tss awareness is net. ill#;
m i it BHen reflection Is directed
Upon tlmaotshd lie. object * new object aftaaa#; the;ego* ;fbi.s ego 
appears ss belonging fcrtfes feflseted upon act, cot. the reflect!^ act* 
Ofhea tbe-'eenseiousosss vWidi says'f jblnh Is fumetsety «ei lie oeofctoee* 
ness
At the beginning of'this-chapter. *» diOtiisgolabed between tie 
and tie 8ft-** fatelie«alJte different aspects of the m m  reality* the 
ego*- Later we shall spell m i this distinction mere. ■eiflieifly^ 
for tie present we speak of them as ibe ego* ff we ■consider -the 
psychological theory that/the e p  acts eg- it dess because of'its love 
.for itself* then the- ego*® nets ere only performed to mtisfy its im  
g | #&*■ This theory comes about as a result of confusing the reflected 
m i unrefiected levels of consciousness* m i in fact* purports that 
the reflected level preeedes. 'the onrafieotsd level*-' 'The psychologists 
In this ease heto# the refloated consciousness in which an ego appears 
m original and ontological ly prior'W the unrefiected one* since they 
'affirm that all acts aft performed in relation 'to ah egowhlch fa air­
ways present* although implicitly of iwoonscloosiyt" prior to'reflec­
tion*. this* Sartre ssya'«ui*f'be absurd because it would involve 
saying 'that-consciousness 1# hot .essentially consc|bw»iss of 'Itself * 
and that ,eeoeeiou#0«9S If not..sppntaneô ».i This psychological theory
dartre, gg* ̂ 4:$ p* 4»*. - %e|p% pp* fM6»
46
commits what dames called "the Psychqlqgist’s fallacy" by attributing
to tbs unreflected consciousness of m  object that is desired what
reflect ion reveals about tbs reflected upon desiring, namely that
there is an ego which is seen as doing the desiring*
instead of this psychological theory, Sartre says that "it is
on the reflected level that the ego-life has Its place* and on the
unreflected level that the impersonal life 'has Its place.
I piiy Peter, -and I go to his assistance* for my consciousness 
only one. thing, exists at that; moments Peter having-tô be-helped. 
This quality of "havi ng-1o-be-helped" lies In Peter* -it acts on . 
■me like a force* * * * i m  i» the presence of Peter|:s, suffering 
just a# t am in the presence of 'the. color of this inkstandj'there 
is an objective world of things and actions* done or to be done, 
and the. actions mm to adhere as quatHle#. to the, things which 
. ■ call for. them,2
lartr#- ©alii: unrefiected consciousness* spontaneous consciousness* 
"impersonal" because of Its essential nature to be wholly directed 
■towards its object* 'whether 1-t is m  Inkstand or Peter having-to-be- 
■helped* the unreflected consciousness Is* to be'sure* consciousness 
■(of) consciousness, .but this, awareness I# not the reflective awareness 
In which an object appears! there Is no eg© at the unreflected level* 
There is, only a personal ego-life at the reflected' level* On the re* 
fleeted level "It Is iy helpful consciousness which appears to me as 
having to be.perpetuated#*®
11 th Sartre, we can now inquire into the •constitution of the 
ego* The ego is a transcendent unity of the transcendent unities,
*!hid«* p . 68* 
P» 68*
®lbld*, p* 56.
4?
states* aetiortSjand qualities, and it is these latter unities that we 
must now examine in order to understand what the e-g©$s* • -̂ fhe-state ' 
a?^ea#s:t® reflective' consciousness* ■ The state i s g i ver* to'It#' and ft 
the object of a concrete Intuition# If i hate ̂ eier# my hatred of 
Pete#' Is’a state that I can apprehend by reflection*"3' This state ap­
pears as beyond any particular manifestation of It*. Inthe same vay 
that we found that the ego was behind the- reflected consciousness* 
that 'is* the hatred appears through a-particular expert eneeof repug­
nance and as transcendent to this' consciousness of Peier-aa-repugnant* 
the. hatred is given as a permanent transcendent unity of- conscious­
nesses of 'rspugninpe# 'This stats of hatred towards Pets# ■.exists step 
when I am. wot considering Peter* or the state 'Itself# It does wot 
appear In Its entirety each time It Is manifested in a particular con- 
seioutw.es% nor can m fee certain that ms do hat® Pete#* *tt ts.-oar» 
tain that Peter 1® repugnant to me* But It, It and always will remain 
doubtful that I hate him# * * * This can be seen when someone, after 
haring said in anger* *1 detest you* * catches himself and says# *11 1# 
■not true*: I do not detest you* I said that in anger* ’n2. This points 
.out that the particular consciousness doe® not implicate anything fee** 
yond the moment and could not I® a state? m mm as a state is affirm­
ed It ha®, meaning wow and for the future# the meaning for'the future 
that a state* such as hatred# .affirms is always of a doubtable nature*
.j
since it affirms:'more thaw- It'knows* ■ iy hatred for Pete#. Is a trans­
cendent unity of aw Infinity of consciousnesses of repugnance that
Ifbid** p. 61. fcffeld*# p* 64.
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■ unreflected esnseitestete of repugnance is refieetedyporu te mm as 
- the elate' la constituted In a reflective eat* m when I say *1 hate
you#” then ay action of revulsion my- ha ■§©#* as coming from the state
■ of.tetrad'*, The elate is realty only: passive -aloes 11 is eonstituted
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sciousness, and.the spontaneous .act of consciousness. . The spontaneous 
.sot® of consciousness cannot be grasped without making them Into an ob­
ject which would destroy their. 'Spontaneity* ■ ft Ismueh the same, as 
we haws sa©%* with what dames calls the transitive part© of COO- 
,selo«eoets# .which .cannot le.gr&sped without. destroying. the!#' 'nature, to 
be 'transitiue*.- The .action -of driving a, ear, li'fee the action -of douhb* 
Ihgr has a liberal Oration and is 'both' the unity of the strew of- 
active .consciousnesses of .driving*., or doubting:, and the .overall con-
ft
crets fealiaation of', them* . ioth of these .unities are. transcendent to
the. -ooneolousnesses, out-of which they are constituted in ref.loot Ion,;.
m i era subject .$e the;. .1 Imitations that such a relative existent hasj
that Is* they ar© doubtable, passive, and do- not appear at the level
of unreflooted «»nsei®tî iess#-,.'
of psychic disposition, mmm .Into existence when
a .certain disposition la eeen.as beion§lng to an egos
., fhen we have experienced hatred several times toward different 
pereon% or-tenacious resentments* or protracted angers* we 
unify these diverse manifestations by..'Intending.a.psychic dis~ :.. 
position for producing them* ». *. * The quality Is. given as a 
: pot©ntlai.|ty*. a virtuality* which, under the influence of dh* > 
verse f actors* .can pass into actuality*. Its actual ity Is. pr©«
. clsely the state (or oaUon)** :
Since..! exhibit over and over a repugnance fof atst paisley. I have
.the 'quality of being.a hater of -.people* Ibis quality Is a..potential-*.
Iiy that beoaneft actualized ••■in a, particular .state of hatred* -Say for
Peter* , This qua! % ty Is. esseniiaiiy differeot from, the State of ha-.
*Above, pp. £5~£6 
Stbid*. p* m  *
%af.tfe4-Op* cit.* p.
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the ego cannot be grasped through a stair or action* Any
attempt to apprehend the ege directly will meeiwith fatter© because 
It Is nothing more than ih# states ©rations that 'It supports. Hi© 
ego .appear© on theherlzon of the states and actions somewhat similar 
to the nay that dames would m f the ©go is on the»fringe« of the 
©tat©©- and actions. The ©go is felt on the fringe of ©tat©© and ac­
tions -as that which unifies them a© the rotation that hold© between 
them. Th© ego that doe© appear on the horizon of my state of hating 
Peter is only given a© th© ego which has that ©tat© incorporated Into, 
it# end I© not given In -It© entirety ©Kcepi a© emptily indidat.ing -that 
there Is tnore*
vSeoaos© there i© always more to th© ©go than appear© the ©go is 
open to doubt, as are all. transcendent unities,' Such a© state©, ■Ac­
tion* and qualities, ’ that this means can .be seen more clearly if we 
accept what Gurwitsch fay©'©bout the deufeiabiHty of the egos
This.doe© not mean that wrsmy be’ In'doubt if we'bav© an ego, or 
■ that .the ©go-, m f possibly 'turn out to be a mere hypothesis. It 
simply means that whatever m  know or .believe to know about the. .©gs^sur own or that -of .other ptrs0ns«*.and' be this knowledge "grounded upon :a single apprehension or upon a certain number of apprehensions, however great, ihi ©know! edge I© permanently in 
■mm of 'î ing-oenf If mod by further apprshensloiis#1
Thus, the ego that If' in doubt does not have r «r«at-eg»* that it if
compared with? rather ihe ego is by nature a. relative.existent that
owes Its being to the reflect tv© consciousness* ■
The relation between the Individual consciousnesses, the states
%urwitsch, g$h» pit.. pp. 357-338*
and actions, and the ©go can be boot explained by starting with m  
©Mtmpl* ©f how they appear to bo -related th m f tm ilm *  then 1 haw© 
m  experience of pleasure while eating peanut butter.* I' ©ay *M ilk© 
peanut butter** IM* liking for peanut bolter is seen m  produced by 
my ■©§©* Thus, In this reflection, ft way appear that ray ©go sponta* 
neously produced ray liking for peanut bolter which In torn produced 
ray ©f p-leaiur© while ©afing peanut butter#, this view of
th© ego a© spontaneous is m result of making conscious Ilf© into m 
object* Actually ||i» eg© It. o©n$tll«ted through the- ©tales ©f liking 
peanut better*, .and these- states are themselves constituted from the 
spontaneous--consciousnesses of' pleasure .giving peanut hotter* il Is 
Only In. reflection that consciousness projects Its own Spontaneity Ini# 
the ego so- that it appears that "the ego is the creator of Its states 
-and sustains Its ©lalltles In ê Sst©**®© by a .soft of preserving *pon» 
taneity**̂  Sul this ego Is passive* receiving all that it is from 
the reflective, act* m 'that the spwtsneiiy that .appear© Is not that 
of consciousness*, which is wholly directed: I© it# object. Hather,
H M »  spontaneity,, fjaofeaewted and hvoostatle^t -In an object* becomes 
a. degraded and bastard ©pthtan©I.ty* which ̂ gically preserves it®, 
creative power even while becoming passive* Whence the profound if*- 
rationality of the notion of th© ego.
the notion of the ©go is irrational because it is seen as both 
actively producing my liking for peanut butter while It Is seen as
'%«ftr©* rg», ©it*. p* fa* %bid*. p. 81*
m
passively■ tmptmd-'-vp- .the ego seems to
produce o state of; liking of peanut butter, whileeor relatively .being 
■passively modified %  what It produces. «So that the ego Is alleys 
surpassed %*what It although, from another point of vlew*.
If |$ what It - jHRMtocie*** ■.' Only It m  apprehend ■ ■tmmlmwm® as. It. It 
wnrefleoted open do we see that. It'It 'is«tolo«tnees .that. It «po»ta*: 
mous, ■. and it not, affected .by ."the .%ots of the ego#'4*' It is
only if we view things at they really areg ihatihs ego Is seen «* the 
passive, transcendent object that Is.affooted fey ell the states and .so* 
lions fhat fMs'Seen through*. ,
, fNrego aim appears m a»'.irfa.tlefml :«ynlh#tle of modenoe r 
and; Interiorify to the '.pefleetlve- oonsoio«enees# : Intertef ity: slgaiflea 
that', the existence of consciousness and Its awareness of. itself is one 
and the same thing* «fherein consists the proper mode, of conscious­
ness* 'existence for which appear ing is altogether :th# same as being, 
m i on. this; eetiBUfti is' endowed: with *fe»otet*ae«s&,,s .
fhls inter ter ity .cannot 'fee grasped- «wy.,{aore,ttaii spontaneity oarr. fee 
grasped# ■■■tv- grasp It' would be f# give |i the: character of an object 
mi- make It something ether, than Inter lor i%*-.which cannot-fey nature 
have an. outside that- can 'fee grasped* 1$ though the ego- my appearto 
ho., an- Inter lor ity* 14. Is a-degrade • interlef ity INI I© closed open 
itself#:, .|f the ego wJfe absolute- Inferiority It could fee- conceived
1 ibid*, jp* 80. ®that Is, phenoraenologically viewed* 
wltsdht - on*' ©14* $- p. ■ 380*
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ego a®'it is, only as it'Is in relation to the particular state or 
action through which it Is viewed* As I look at my liking of peanut 
•.hotter* the ago that appears is only my ego as a llfeer of peanut 
hotter* ,
: this trouble that we.have in viewing the ego Is primarily do© 
to its oaf or# of appear log 'Only on the horizon of- the' states and act ions 
through which it is seen,I ,«?bf# is because In trying to apprehend 
the- eg© for Itself and as a direct object.of my consciousness,, I.fall
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Ifae-I# feeing #10 i-an# goat toward it, goes i© rejoin It*. that is 
ail one can say**?
:‘ M  a'wsoli :©f the'states' sod actions being transcendent objects
110 ’oonsctOMsnOss they feso- whatever pf |va|Ofitss we way think- 'that they
bami ■In relation' to., mr ''
■:.: Gonseqyentiy, .if Paul and , Peter both speak of P & t tH  iove, 'for .©sample, it is no longer,two that the'on© sneaks blindly and by 
■ 'analogy of that which ihe other apprehends in full, they speak of the same thing# Doubtless they apprehend .11 by, different proce- 
; dures, hot these procedures may ho ©dually intuitional*
■ fb© .only, thing, that ilffer«»tiates' between' the way that fWhsr and Paul 
.'apprehend '|%t©H&. Mat* «f lev© is that 'to'fetor this' state' ie-given 
'as more intimate than It "is. to hot they both, view It. as an- ©b* 
jeei, .whose mode of existence Is passive and relative# It is only 
fddwlfei* for Peter and- Paul to see this state.'as an object feesaos© the
: ego insMdh It. beidngS is also an-object fm Piter..and Paul-*' iMe .
• means that for .neither Peter 'nor Paul does Peter %  love'of 'the'-ego to 
whioh it is seen as.belonging -have a eertain existence, and that Paul 
can know Peter*© love and ego as'well as’ feter ©an.know it#
' 'Ihe only.paf|-.of f%i©r# which I# not foaliy.-apart of .f̂ ter# 
that ©annei bo viewed- by .Paul. Is fetor*'s. ©oesoiouseets* ttMpefi- thin
■ consciousness is not'available- to Peter either# In' fast* ■ we cannot 
say that it is Peter*© consciousness, rather that'the ego that is des­
ignated by- the name fetor is ah object for consciousness* Conscious- 
mm ■ Is- essentially' impersonal 'bed spontaneous and ©an only ’be' ©on* 
eeived by itself In a non-positional awareness#" if in W f  lection I
Atfeid* pp* 9&*93* %b|d#f p* 95*
.try to tocelv® of toeoftoftesii :f make m  ©bjeet m i  of 1% and ;to- 
Scioto©©® I# m  longer spontaneous #r fnteHority* the p§© cannot 
to® any' i«fiu®fid© on this- Impersonal'. tosctowstos, aito the eg© . 
owes what It I® to*' toscfcuams®* Similarly, consciousness is not - 
limited by the ego and way' m tpass it at m f to rn * Because conscious­
ness is spontaneous, the ego which is seen a© hating Peter may suddenly 
' lev® faster, and at the- reflective level m ©Mplaft&iton .of this sodden 
love ©an be foundj it it found only when this loo® is seenas consti­
tuted fto. the. spontafseoos sots, of consciousness which «r©dt toted 
towards Peter as a lovable person*.
ititot the ego there could be m  distimtieft between IN-possible 
and the real ©r between appearance and- being because in the inspersonal 
e®toio«s«#sS' these .diet twit term ..«#«, not. presented* i t is only because 
- the ego Is doubtable -that there ©an fee any question a# to what ..is pos­
sible or real, and what Is eppeafafte® or -being* At the. level of eon- 
mimsmm all iS'absolut#'a«d.:̂ speatoce Is .being**- The ego, serves, 
as: a practical manifestation .of consciousness, a unity that t o  fee seen 
I© act and'live In. the world* . Saftr® tpeeulatai that, tosoiodtots way 
.mm produce the ego to mask the spontaneity of consciousness from . 
Iteolf*
But It can 'happen that consciousness suddenly produces itseif on 
tb© pur© reflective level* Perhaps not without the ©go, yet as 
.©scaping from the ©go on all.sides,- as.domitoihg'the' ©§© and. . 
maintaining the eg® outside the consciousness by a continued crea­
tion, *,« * Then consciousness, noting, wto could be. called the 
fatality of Its spontaneity, is suddenly anguished? it is this.
*©f« Qurwitsch, og« cit,, p.* 330, also above, p* $$* ‘
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the problem #f solipsism. $©iip®i§». for Sartre is the metaphysical 
position', that the -eg© .nhldh all other < p®tmm m 4  
the, world, pm their ®*cifUmt t # life. .Sartfe 9 s thssry the ■ a g o■ .&ro©fn#s
a transcendent ©hj##i whose shifts®©© is l ike that'-at other people
and the world, .anil the eg© Is.not-as ahwluW. However., this does
avoid solipsism with respect:ta- ©sntisi®usnsss|.-.stfss as.lt is impersonal 
a-view that S&fire doss m i '4aal with, in this-essay.
lith.Sartre%,theory:of the ego the question of whether It is an
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affirmation of f.he feign of the . hussar ■-.this freedom to doubt the 
existence of everything leaves m t if we exercise this power to it© 
fullest extent, at the level where we are a floihingiMMi** HMe can even
wi thdraw f t m  everything, within hi rise if tfe-Iefe. is mtura, from hie mem­
ory, his imagination, his body* ffe can withdraw even, f r m  time m& take 
refuge in the eternity of the 9$ could. say that we are at the
.level of per® consciousness where all there is la- m m s im m m ® .
everything, that w& have doubted* However, the ego that -Seneart©© 
finally affirms m  the ground for these dewHing is net
fQund at this level« There' is re<plfed .a reflective act that is di~
-f'acted to' the doubting rn n m lm m m m ^ to see m  ego. which- appears m  
performing the dmMlng action*
fhsft SeseaHos performs the %>glfpu he performs it in conjunction 
with methodologleal doubt, with the ambition of *advancing science*, 
etc*, which ar* actions and states* Thus the Artesian 
-•:- -douhtj ©te*, are%tM#re given’' m' ©ndertafelng© of m
if m  exercise -our freedom to doubt until we reach the level where m
.are a nothingness, then no ego will appear as it- does'to iescartes
whsn he owes from .thl®. level to * reflective sort that tries to grasp
the spontaneous act of doubting. It Is when the doubting is seen as
an action, a transcendent unity,4 that an -ego- appear?* thus* there' is
the distinction between the acts of consciousness at the unreflecied
d̂esn-Paui Sartre, ^Cafteslao freeefom,tr .11 iefMv.. .and. Philosopfv» 
i-Cal.£fesay.e», brans. iishalssopr fitmdon* iidir and Company, l§5fyp.* 178,
%lfeiy». p* ITS, Ŝartre, The Tranacendenee of ..the, goo, p* S2
fcSHifit ©| SufzisatftuAs Aim JQJ «s©n̂ W* saoP zjyqfQq H 
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■at the level of perception# and thereby does not- provide for any unity 
which reflection# or apperception# can reveal*' it is this problem that 
■we will use as 'the basis for an approach to a theory of consciousness 
in Chapter four*..
Hogat ding' Lelfcalx** statement concerning the body#1 m  can see a 
■point where laf#e would seem, to 'disagree- with him* ;'fsrtrs conceives 
the h«% as an Illusory fulfillment of the ego* It is Illusory be**- 
caeae In this Instance the ego has lost Its tntfiieey In hooding a**
■. demised* for leibnis, the body is m  of the. soul to
which It is attached* It Is the epstleiisferat -manifestation of -the 
force of the governing soul* However, both ietbnii and Sarir® would 
regard any theory which treated the body as the primary source of our 
■belief In ourselves as existent as a radical misunderstanding of the 
relation between the ego and the body*. Both wouldconstder the acts 
of consciousness as. fundamental to- the physical manifestation of con** 
sciousnesso in. other words, Sartre and ielbnlz would say that the 
psychical Is primary to the physical0
Sartre could say that ioeke was headed In the right direction# 
as was Bescarte®, but they disregarded the evidence of mental active 
Ity In assuming, that there Is a self which originates, these actions* 
iocke should have remained at the level of what is experiencable# as 
' Indeed he said he- was going to* , that was given to him were the ®oper» 
aliens of the mied^ef mental, processes and the objecispresent |#
2K-*** •. 
..
f : • %
f
 I 
I'
4MT 
*** 
^ •
2 
#
m 
& 
%*,
&3II 
*■•***
a
 
s
■8■g1!1***.I
■%» 
<*«# 
«**■
I 
. 
I 
t
 
*
-
 
*. 
I
'S’ 
g
I
 
*■ 
f
‘■£3; ’• 
© 
-tftffcf
iifgi
■
w
 
*
**#■ - 
**&
M
~
M
I 
I 
1 
I i *
M
 
<*»«r»  
1 
® I
j 
5"
a.
I
tiwlitf lyiftf #1$ the mental pfeeesiee 'Whfdh we He was* a# 
was Seseafetee# already predtepomi .tornM an egelegy by a 
,#eif''ia fe present throughout the ffews# If was the
■self which performed the earleufe Inspiring# mi feel|«vMI in them «».
■feeing hie that'attributed I# tfe# tî pleing prM&tis themselves a efelf 
*ht<$ united th«» in ether words, locfce committed "the Psychologist's 
• ̂ tlacy* fey tahing what he found to fe tree ef the reflected mental 
pfttc&Ngmt end applying of nw&tfti life, ■■He did .net
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and, particularly, Leibniz gave the evidence of the mind a primary sta­
tus. Sartre says that the spontaneous tmmimemm is the.first con­
dition -and absolute source of existence, Leibniz says that there is 
nothing but the mind itself which is force, and all'that is ©patio-'' 
leaf-oral It a manifestation, of. that force* '
Hume’s rton-egologicai theory has more affinities with Sartre’s 
than teefce%, although the 'refin̂ miftis that farire offers go‘beyond 
Hume. Mums was- overwhelmed by hi# discovery that we apparently' 'have 
no- direct experience of a 'permanent self'lasting threughftti' the Individ 
m l acts of consciousness* tb© problems failed in this discovery* are 
dealt with by Sartre, i© find only separate mental acts in our experi­
ence* -Haweveft. it is' only in metWy and' reflection that they are join- 
ed -to one self-, there is a synthesis of these acts even as I ref lee* 
fively examine my experience* loeofding to Sartre, if we consider 
this synthesis Itself we will find that It Is an active consciousness 
that constitutes the ego from the ’states and action©,- which are objects 
constituted by active consciousness also,, an ego*' Even though Hume 
conceived consciousness as active, he did not conceive if as the'  ̂
t wee ef the self* thus, what, for Sartre, we find In reflection is 
an ego that appear© as the source of the acts of consciousness. Hume 
-also- finds an ego that appears In reflection as the source of the acts 
of consciousness, but he- cannot account for this'since it cannot be 
found in the individual acts themselves. According' to Sartre, what
1Above, pp. lf-21.
67
Hunt 414 not real!?# was ■ that the ego appmred in reflection 'Immum  
it was constituted by tbs reflective act* Hume’s Iasi.® biff ieuMywas 
that I® did not draw-the distinction between the iinre.fl sc tad conscious- 
nee©, and tie; reflective ̂ c©ns®iwintse# Hume found nothing. In exper |« 
once except the individual perceptions themselves* WA11 of.these are 
different;, and distinguishable, m i separable from each other* and may 
' fee separately considered# and may exist- separately, m i have m  need of 
any thing to support their existence*1,1 They were not .given with any 
sort of >*-stiff -they, were. tupefsemyU Vet,. In reflection a- self could 
fee found that lathe source and unifier of these separate perception®-*.
In the first place, Sartre would say that the separate perceptions were
; t _ : . .
■noi>»positionaliŷ «d ̂ Tttsslvelŷ 'î fithesf'ged-as a. .unity# -aTttms#* they, 
were impersonal * Hie -self that It found in reflection Is, as Hume
said, only found In r#fl#ctlo%:fe«t the-.relations between, the separate
• > • > 1 » ; ' £
parent ions are already. there, before they are reflected upon* in the 
second place,Sartre -would say that Hume did not reslizethat although 
w  '©go cowl# fee f ound In .reflection this did .not mean that - our eon* - 
sciousness is personal, it, only meant that, the ego can fee. found a©., the 
object, of a-reflective-actf the 'reflective act itself is not personal* 
to m - saw that memory .played- an Iwporiant role In.dlscovering*. as 
a producer of ..the-perceptions which can fee related, a. personal Iden­
tity#- that 'he- did not see was that the relations among, the separate 
perceptions that memory discovered were.already unreflectlvely there
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to a r«f}«ellon ignoring consciousness at it slwply presents itself 
that an «go it postulated as outside of time* Kant Is forced by bis 
reflective dMfewiM to account far 'the $$»*» origin outside #f. the 
consciousness which It produces because he did not make the distlnô
%
I
i
mm- t® I© fttt.fjrigtft «f the stitm§ aeti e®«# *# the ©g#t 'It U u  
origin which If i»tffvid«ai ’and f«f>eit€tnaif which creates Itself in 
■tlffle at. every Instant of our life* *U determines 'Its. existence at 
each Instant* withmit our feeing alls to conceive anything before its
>■t&I«u■»%1
»Jma-
f# 
«i1
I
*i
time# m i conceive the Igo and-the not m  fpesftdd** but given
m  eo*er*gInaI«r.; H & f a ’ Indeed Viewed the l§o and 'the ®a«-tg© m  t*»' 
etpofdity determining each other as objective activities that are 
posited together so that the pore of 'the fge can have sit
object! ' *TI»'|»»r* activity of the £g» 1%. 'ihitftfiimi now# Ss m m  .re*- 
■ *pif*sdt :the cause i f  the objective activity of the tgo, since no ob* 
jest 'oari fee posited without ' Sartre ©latterly Resits Of -con* 
sclousness as having both the ego and the world, what Fichte calls the 
'ItoMig** m  objects for spontaneous consciousness# which is an empty 
spontaneity directed wholly outside of itseifV' the self~consciousness 
that fldhtm- speak© of can he lovfefstead &  . aw^©net«
of 'itself' since ©ellVc^clo^iiess for Fichte is hot m  object;# .nor Is 
it ah existentj fattier’It Is the ‘condition for esftetenc#*
■'■ 'Idealism Is avoided by Sartre# .and this intefpretatlon of 
finite# because consciousness cannot be mad© an object for itself#
' like the I '©§o of' fehtj and ic«scloiidhesS' 'is net the sub-
jest because it no hanger hasany content due to. Its spents»eity*- ?he 
' "Only' way 'that fartfe*s 'theory -can become ah' ideatlim is to -try' to grasp 
' conscioosnsss anil make an object owt'o# it# ''thereby endowing It with 
. an ego an# an opacity that, .was not there snrsflsbtlveiy* M  -Is then 
’this ego 'that Is seen, a® the score© of alt being# a source that ideal­
istically contains ‘the content of the wcrld, ty affirming the source 
of being to be an empty Consciousne©©# Sartre and Fichte place the em-
phasis on consciousness the fgo and the
4*bm  can bo -said to. ftti&iee the tm  trend® of thinking. ihsi 
too come out of $©ttofo% that If -Ihe nee*egelegfeat and #g©l#gloal 
theories of consciousness* dames is concerned only with explaining 
consciousness as It appears*. tlnjtf. <Jamos and laftf© too In common 
their 'lost## to -ŝ plstit what, oonselsiwn##® If#: M  m  too :In#ieatsd#̂  
there are several problems that arise concerning 4 m m * theory, and it 
la to those that m shall apply Sari?a*a theory of <^neeieustos* 
th# first problem oimeefne #» relation hattoe, the. present, 
judging thought and whal it appropriates. It .would seem that Ibero 
is apart the Thought that aelos&iieally retains all, that has gone 
on, before it in previous, thoughts,. and a.paft that can actively 'leiaoi 
from ;these'retentions the parts that - It wishes to use. or .consider in 
the present, phase of consciousness. A SartHao answer would- be- that 
the m m flm ipi pmmlmmm® itself perf-omi the function of cant in** 
ually synihesmng the, -past and present, moments of consciousness*
What. Sartre dots not account for it the way -that the.: present, conscious* 
m m  select# a -certain part of this synthesis to utt. or conoid#* ft 
.may-be that what appears to be-' a seleotfve- process -is only a Function 
that Is attributed to the. ego* while consciousness, as spontaneous,, 
does net select* it is pur# activity* this would still not'account 
for IN# fact that m ton#! -re»sw4«r pertain things at pm- time, which 
may of m y  m i besoms available- at a later- time. It my be that dames’
I A b o v e ,  pp.# 2 5 * 8 8 *
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pbaae "of eenseide@eee%' jwt -be sttti 'mat* % bet# that .fber© Is a 
mtl>':pre!se*it*-; Sartre wmM ssjr tbat dsase ta wittatetjr■' applying to
tlie «nr©ftested theqg^b'wNit lie finds in tts refteste# ttegtet#: that 
Is*.! m ;ege* ;ti will ■ tiM ttet ;Sar#©% tbibff ebetd' be'Sociable to 
if 'torn* eers «ttii»g t® -irtfeti tteat 'the present wefleeted ® 
thought wes î befioest fn teiufe*1 la woeld fere avoided:' some of bis
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the body, dames believes, I® the paint where my past |® attached 
Id myBelf by the present thought,, he speculates*
The sense of my bodily existence, however obscurely recognised mWish., may then be the' absolute original of my edacious selfhood, 
the fundamental perception that j| gi* All aooropratlons may be 
made M J h  fey a Thought not at the moment Immediately cognised fey 
.itself** '
Sartre' would answer that this feeling jg£ the 'body at such I®- 6m to 
looking at consciousness as II appears in impure reflection* and trying 
to see the ego that Is found as being fulfilled by the-body* an illu­
sory fulfillment*2 dames1 speculations are the- result of trying to 
find'a.self 'that can express the present unrefleeied Thought, ah at* 
tempt that $s#tr© would not find necessary*
" dames* theory learning "'the 'irans*live-and suhslanllve parts of 
- consciousness can be understood in terms of loftfe*# theory of «on»
• sciousness*3 Sartre would say that although the parts Thai dames is 
talking about are only‘found by dames In the reflected consciousness, 
'we can see. that what doses has -said about the'transitlye paris-sx* 
'presses much of what ̂ 'feeftafd'ef the spontaneity of consciousness* 
‘"That 'Is,' It is the' essential nature of transitive consciousness to' be «> 
ungraspable, as is the nature of spontaneous ••consciousness* 'to 'make 
an object out of either one would bo To destroy, or at least degrade, 
‘what it is* ' -lore important' is dames1 realization that consciousness:
Is'hot .mad# up of separate moments of ‘ cohsclousnets that can be distin­
guished from -each other5 it is instead a' stf-ea® in which all moments
* dames, f>flqoielpa, of fsvchology. p* .141*
Ŝartre, gg* oil** p. S©« %feove, pp* £&»££«
g
II
I
jeets*- ' there sflt# «m«y :pr«Mafisa that neither tfctator 'SgHwlfto&lty, 
deals with, as m have indicated,1 concerning how the ©go or self. ttt» 
corns ami lable to othera,, whether .an expl i cl t m i of the conscious- 
■«es& is required -to reveal the,ego, or whether*: as James suggests,
Abefe-can he thought-transference,. I t must fe remembered that in no 
case would Sartre say that the spontaneous consciousness itself could 
become available for public inspection0
% way of summary, in light of Sartre1© .theory we can go. back
2<> The question that is concerned with' whether anything extraneous 
to the' present flow of consciousness is added in reflection is answered 
by Sartre*s theory that the ego an# lit states and'aottons'are.added hy
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Ideal instead,. %, finds that theft, I# absolute. spontaneous ■ ,«*** 
seledaneae*. that It 'm% a subject leesttse.ti la empty eC content, and 
which. haa the eg® and. the world, which .are ;c®»®rl§ina|f. as It. 6bjeeta*
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Briefly,, feptre** theory of It that with respect
to Itself* consciousness is non-positionai m i nor>egologicai tl the 
unrefleeted level, Only in reflection can on ego be found? the -ego 
Is transcendent to consciousness and I# the.unity of states and ae* 
"tiens* which are themselves transcendent unities* the ego is a ptm» 
Sive .relative existent constituted fey reflective consciousness* to 
.providê  a background for the development of this theory* m  have look#* 
ed at somt. of the principal theories of consciousness in 'Modern Phi­
losophy and sane of' the problems that arise In these theories, in 
"this chapter m  shall now develop sob® problems Inherent lit Sartre* s 
theory Itself* In particular* we shall consider the discussions- of 
Sartre by Arm Gurwitschl and. ftoufice hatansor»8g In the present -essay 
we can only hope to sketch some of the difficulties and problems that 
Sartre’s theory must answer.
In his article m  "A fton»egolegical Conception of Consciousness** 
Aron Qurwitsch begins with m  account of the theory of consciousness
1Aron Gurwitsch, »A ton-egologieal Conception, of Consciousness, n 
PMfosophv aBd Phenomeno Research* I (1940), pp. 325-538.
2feurice hatanson, «ffie 6̂ >.|r|cal and Transcendental Ego,« Liter-- 
â rê ...ByLl.osophŷ d.iM.,,Soclal.:..Scl.encea. (The.Mag.uei Hijhoff* 1962),
pp* 44-54,
held fey Husserl in the first edition -of the joglsebe Untersudhungen6* 
■Mwaaert maintains that i» particularly pf%»reft«»»
iive ones (what we have so far called unrefleetive ones), on#.does,net
e^erienc#- his act m  pert of'hie personal life# 'the ego .that can fee. 
found only in reflection I# nothing- but the'welted complex of mental 
fasts# thus In reflection all that oftfe* den® Is to aserlbes a mental 
act to this complex, and there Is no center from which the act ©might 
Issue*
fester tft.th» Ideas, sad the Gurwitsch ofe*
serosa, Itaiseft endorsed an egoleglcal conception of consciousness.
■.Me advocated the concept of a *pafe ego11 from which phenomenological 
analysis allegedly reveals air acta .to emerge# the. ’♦pwfe «ge* la.not 
attached to and all acta emerge from thk same
vpure. ego* which transcends them#,
It is against-'this latter s^oeptioo that feftr© works out his 
'theory, vindicating Husserl*§ earlier view# .Ifcifwffseh agrees with , 
.Sartre that o^aeiewsneiss. is- neurological., but asks where the ego 
come# from when an act Is reflected upon, Gurwitsch explains that.re­
flection does modify the reflected to some extent; however, reflection 
should .only m k m  solicit and disclose the features of what Is reflect* 
ed on and not, give rise to something -that was net already there, such
m
as'tteego*
In other words'* ■ reflection’ I& held fey Sartre 'to dopeflhdu©©-©’ - 
w t  object and to bo over and above the- necessary condition .of 
‘ the constitution ted'e^fstete©■«# tMa-object* wife** the ago*’ ■ • 
How than m y reflection# as characierixad above, give rise to a 
’ new object? Shat id the nature1 of the'objectgiven:rise tel 
Under what aspect does this object preseni itself under the con** 
ditions in quest ion? 1I must-tere conf $m  myself -to tetsiog these 
quest ions* pointing out what i believe to be a gap in .iarttete 
■' '■ irguttwhiatloh*-*■ 1 ■
,. :Sttrwitsfib goes on to speak of, two 'Consed^^c. ®f '-Sarlf©*#. ©onr 
teptfen, of states, and actions as objects and ©©netttoted
e^ttesl© pities* '.Do can acdswit for- any mistakes «©■ might-mate with 
reject Id; our dated of .actions! for m m pt % ; I thought I .■ haled. this 
v typewiter#,.stress;f find'that 1’ love it--Instead* ■ This mistake I©-: 
pess-ifel© b©cs«s©:..tte Mats bf'teting* is, '©ensti.tuted outof previous 
'feelings .that i have- had toward this typewfiter# each of tfetdfe'Waft it- 
. self-a, certainty*'’ ‘ th this constitution m mistake may have been made* 
ansi even If not there m y arise & 'subsequent 'feellog’ toward this, 'type*
■ writer that #iit ©tenge the atsf%' but never ©tenge the- facts of -which 
It is closed* ■ : >
 ̂fte: otter consequence is ’in connection with the apprehension of 
Other' persons* minds*® iy ego,' stales and 'actions ate available to ■ - 
everyone since they af© transcendent to consciousness of -Item; 'they no 
"longer'belong exclusively to me* It Is only my consciousness that re­
mains inaccessible to anyone else except myself, but we can -understand
■ •’ - i' : * ' :
each other through the availability of our egos?
%ur wit seh, gg* ell*, pp* m &*SIS* ' %bdvef .pp» 68»&.
II ■ Is*. ■ of 'course, ' t&ai my friend ■less®®®!®;: conscious - of, his. ■: 
love by means of acts quite different from those by means of which 
• I become conscious of his .lave* Vet the: sens# of- objeetivitycoo*
. flsii specifically in that the object, as identically the same,
■-.may; an# doe# present Itself -acts different-'-ewe' anettor
net only numerically but also typically**
1 I • ^  : : ' ■ ; , ■
• Thus, we do 'net have to account for our- knowledge of other .people by 
the means of analogy,, at. m  would have to If the ego were an essential, 
structure of consciousness, which Is Itself Impenetrable and Ifiaoee#* 
tibia to others*
Sufwiiseh goes on to compare the: constitution of the eg* to the 
way that: notarial objects have been found to fee organ!ted unities, of 
qualities and attributes* dust as materialobjecis used to be consid­
ered to have a substance or essence which supports the qualities and 
'1$ th© source from which they Issue, so the «g# used to ̂ -considered 
'the producer of its states -and actions* ft Is the non-egologleal eon*' 
ception ef eenseloKisnesS that will allow m i e-see the eg#-as. the- organ­
ised totality of states and-actions, and discard the- substantive.way ef 
regarding the egot- wAs in- regard -to- material things# thinking In terms 
of substantiality gave .way, to thinking in terms.- of functions and rela­
tions, so, !- submi t, will have to do in all f ields efewperierice»n2 
■ Gurwitsch concludes by speaking of the result of Sarire*s inves­
tigation as being that “The eg# esdsti neither fa  the acts of ©©nsci-oiis- 
ness nor belted these acts.. if stands f a  consciousness and before con­
sciousness* nS - The eg#-only appears from a certain aspect -of, any grasp­
ing. of 1t| it- only appear# In relation to the .actto or state through
%*rwiiseh, §|ĵ * pp* S34-SSS# 3HikU» pa %feid*
which it is grasped.. We eel doubt that m have an ©go# m may only 
be In doubt at to what we know or believe concerning it* We can. never 
have complete knowledge of either our own #r another** ego because 
there are always empty meanings* given with’any apprehension of the 
ego which may or way not be contradicted by farther apprehensions* *l» 
this sense the «§©% feeing. pariiAes of this dufeftafeillty -or better# 
relativity# which is the essential and existential condition of all 
transcendent exiatents*"2
In his essay "The f«p if leal and Transcendental Ego," iaurle© 
'.flatanstn states that the empirical ego is the present event® of my 
conscious life* Such events'are; naturally seen as part of my-personal 
biography# and they are grounded In the spati©temporal world of nature, 
particularly in my body* The transcendental egf^ Is the pure structure' 
of consciousness -that Is the matrix of the spontaneowft Intentional acts*. 
"The transcendental eg© way n o w  be understood as the pure Intentional 
stream of perceptual acts* **
%y "empty meanings" m  understands, wiihGufwitsch, gg# ©M** 
p. 337, "Every apprehension of the ego Invoives empty weanlhgs and Intentions bearing m  dispositions and actions which, for the time feeing* are -not given, i,e., do not appear through a correspondent 
conscious fact' grasped by reflect ion* <*
86urwiiseb, gg, ell** p*ISi«,
Although m cannot develop It here In-detail,' m should note in'-pasting that the transcendental ego for Waianson, taftfe# -and 
Gurwitsch is, unlike Kant's concept# through and through temporal 
We regard 'this as a problem- to be clarified*.
%atans©% gg* oil** p. 45.
. The question about the relation: of; the ttelne*1 'to: this tfiwseen» 
dental ego has had two different answers In the phenoraonologieal tfadi- 
 ̂tion* The f i rst considers experience to he %|.ne**!anly because there 
It .& transoendistttsl.̂ o that Is thegfoiwd for ihfro»J%'i>f iwpetim m  
due, to- it® constitutive activity: the theory that SurwHseh attributes 
bo Husser l *© concept ion in the ideas .and, the ̂ iteili|n.;MttatliVis>i-
,1b© other it feesi ̂ wprwwkM* fey iaftr©*$ :fi©r̂ ©got%i;eal eaneepiioe of 
consciousness, according to which, os m  hove seen,1 oil that is given 
in'0«d Ihfoogh ooooclousneti Is th©.-atf©aa -of' oonsoioosne^^-^s '<*»». 
■.ilnuoes sythesis of past, present and future acts* ■ the ©go is not. 
given In the' Intention©! activity, It, only appears as a '’reflective 
addition,** ■ fher® Is m lfy  the .non**p©sitlon©l; m am im m m m -- (of) oe#*: • 
..seiovsneos of _ something* the... tsansoendental: me, i s cQtrpleielv unneo' L
Natansen sketches a. phen«senological i|fr©aeb to consciousnesss
•, %  approach is. built upon the following theses: first, that the 
deeisive feoiure of consciousness is intentional i ty f second, that 
intentlonall'tyls a nfetotfttqfai and purely a a. qrloyi ’ sifaciafet. 
third, that v̂  imy distinguish between the experiential givenness 
Of intentionality and Its transcendental pfesupposiiions; fourth, 
that .the direst ssp#ential, glvewies© Is non^posittonal or In ■ 
"other; tsrtMa presents'no #ih| but, fifth, that the transcendental 
1 presupositions of intentionalIty do both require and. In some 
' sense, .present a tf«riw»nd«ttgt egm and' sixths. that this Iran- . 
seendental ©go is, the'pure.possibility which metaphysically under-* 
lies andattends the actualization of any empirical ego In' the 
world*®,
The first two theses are necessary fof any phen«»ienologicai ■ 
theory of ©©«se.ioi*s«©8.s end are held by ■Husserl, Sartre, Qurwitsehj,
1 Above, pp« S9-40, %aiansorys gg0 p» 4?.
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dental it:een©@tvtd % ManMff ;i# tw one of ife©.'aeteaiigaflon'ef the 
pure possibilities of the loiter by iy entries! existence 
lo o projection out #f the pore pfroiMlilies of «MteefaMNi«»* for 
Sartre 'this relation obtains between the pferfeflaetive ■ ooosei.eoenese
and the empirical eg*' that It oo*rtlteted’hy;'i't* fetanson says that' 
Sartre never gives a satisfactory answer t# what this relation mt*»- 
oiote i% and Sartre cannot explain this relation wi thout teoourm to
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the correlate of reflective unity that Sppeafa only as one­
sided through the particular state or action, . *«m can I recognize 
the transcendent ego as mine unless the Individual acts of seif-refleo
tittct are -Caught up fa m thematic continuum of' aftlfcrofagnHfaftf*? 
Ihts would imply that there is an ap which to .fact trarssosrufental. 
'ground' and condition of the reflection''in which a transcendent ego is 
■foun# an ego that Is able to recognise this transcendent ego as. its
3
f1
**«4miG.
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the transcendental ago Is net directly presented In the immediacy 
of consciousness, hut Its formal ctuira-cter Is not. restricted to 
Its «validity" or pure poasifeiliiyj instead— ‘and this Is the whole 
point— * the transcendental ego Is continuously evident and nlven In 
the thematic recagnltionthat ©hocks the entire range of experience 
into ̂ Istene® as
'the- transcendental age is the ground for there' feeing m  lifs as 
aft .empirical fulfillment of the petstfelitiie#. of fa 'to w u & m A m fa A  
age* the support of this thesis is; to fee found fey making thematic the 
transcendental ground of intentional life, and .not in oonsclou^sess as 
It Is projected into empirical existence,
tat us fering together, the results of -our discussion fey Indicating 
some of the problems Sartre*s theory leaves us with, and fey offering a 
■tentative solution to those problems,,
Surwitsch asks how Sartre can Speak of reflection as superinduc­
ing a. new object over the unreflective fton-poaitionai consciousness, 
that |S|. the ego* Id fee sure, unreflective consciousness Is held to 
fee uniting. Itself through the continual synthesis of past, present and 
future actsi however, It does not have any quality of' feeing engaged In 
■fey an egos It Is impersonal. Yet ref lection carmot produce what is re* 
fleeted on.?. reflection can only disclose and make explicit something 
that was already there* thus, our problem I# 'how m  can understand 
the ego which is seen in .reflection and was not there- unrefleciiveiy, 
or pre-reftectively.
I n  a similar manner, Watanson asks how the ego that it seen In 
reflection, as a transcendent unity- to consciousness can. "fee conceived 
ft® HI ftgft unleftt there it a .correlative unity on the side of w m o tv w *
1jjyio, p» s2.
m
mm that.'©an apprehend; the as tie own*: 8ot only ;
must consciousness be « unity* hut if must "be 'unified In. such a way ■ ■ 
that Its. recognition of the transcendent ago is a recognition of the 
ego as ala* ffetanson also ash# how tarlre can. account for the rala* 
tion between the, transcendent, ego and the spontaneous impersonal con- 
scieusnessi "What is the connection between the nib! 1st lag stfuctore 
of pf#»re#leeilve consciousness and 'the self-refleeiive person she -has 
a name* a unique biography, and a 1 ife?fll Without a transcendental ' 
ego there can be m  feail.tatlen that sf conscious acts are pari of gg 
life#*
in connection with a previous problem m  afe led to question the 
-accessibility we'hwe i# our consciousness when Qurwitseb says that 
“Sfy ego and my psychic facta, In contradistinction to the conscious 
acts, are then no longer my exclusive property, they are accessible to. 
’ether fxaople, whereas my ̂ neclcesnest Is net!. it Is and remains closed 
and impenetrabi© for everyone except myself*“3 Although consciousness 
is aware of Itself, it Is an awareness that is .iapersonal, or proper* 
soiml .in Surwitseh's terms*4 "fills would imply that even if pure con-
iff* 48*
'tie must realize that any distinction© that we draw with respect to consciousness.are only for analysis? there can be no Infinite rs* gross In trying'to-grasp''the r#leetiog on''the-feflectIng.- In any mo** taeni of consciousness as it. Is itself presented*
3Gurwit©ch, ogu clt«.» p# $!§*.
■ %e emphasize again that ihe%elf~awareness!r of which m  speakIs sifai#t*»ror^rd, -net ref lectio, and Is to be sharply distinguished 
from a reflective,-'hence personal self̂ awafensss*
iiwMiabl*')« th» II
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Is an ©go,. one that |« of #*»■*$$#. of' .donsolowsn©©©*: in 
lli® w M ’taftd*: t*o if. witting I© say;tfeaio©. ©p. It ..proionlorf to- ito pro 
■Fefls©|l̂ :«oi of pli©non̂ n®logl«al̂ InspolI«W* On the other hand, the 
transcendental ©go Is atlegedly presented af the unifier and director
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ftofefdmltlacifct and non-objectivatIng* Worv-poaitionality here hefers 
to a Modlf icsifoo of ;eenseleuimste in wbfdb the object ■ is 'neither be*- • • 
lievedln-«or in-as exIsfonWIt Is t^VNtMi&eri '-calls a .
%ewi?a.lity modification" of ooosoIooioefSf̂  ■ Consolowsness may also 
be objectivaiing ,er not, that fa*. make an object out of that of which 
ItJs'.cbttsoIOos*
An example of I) is il» perceiving of this fable in which the 
table Is neither believed in nor disbelieved in a# existent.} a per-' 
ceiving in which I, as a phenomenologistj, am interested only in the 
way that the-fable as an object is given to the eonseiowsness of' It*
An example of E| is a« aesthetic app.reolatlon of a fable which..is fern*.
1ieved in as existent, although Jam notbusied with if as existent}
I am explicitly busied with it in an aesthetic appreciating* fhe 
table as existent object is only, made a theme of tbj.ect for me when 
I- object I vafe -not the appreciating, but the be! lev i ng-perce i v i ng which 
has been going on all the- time., An example of -51 is an aesthetic ap­
preciation 'of a. table which fa, neither believed in nor disbelieved in 
as existanti perhaps the non-pesitionality can be attributed to the 
•fodl'sifoetness of what Is appreciated due to poor lifting*, the m m  
positionality may also bo due to the. attitude that the- phenomenal©gist 
Is takingo
.'laftfe would say consciousness neither believes nor disbel ieves 
in itself as existing because it does not fo.se facto object*vaie itself*.
Ĥusserl 'Ideap.*' f f *  • 888*800* -
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.6c$&»BAee&v tf does Mi ofejeefluat# itaelf*, but -It 
■glaft^'dr.btJI^'-willi.respesI t* ttieW* .'At flier#.■ i*. ®»seieiswessi> af
I.fktrig--|Miaftoi :ifeer# '>1$: eia^iia*HW^ly;& positional ■oo#s«s;io«#* 
nets °f this eoo#ilous«i#«sv ■ in ftcttp ■ there It a positional eonseldb#*
ftea»'0f a ttttttiMKiMM if peanut butter that m% t» nelfJhef believed 
■to-tier 'diebettevsd. In as ixitifan’i* ■ -ttoa eenseitatnest (of) I# fton*ob»
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lively engaged' In perceiving this Wile#- fhie mean© 'that' along with
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each act of- consciousness which is given with the quality of being pit* 
gaged |n by an ego there Is also given various other consciousnesses 
which are not engaged in by an ego, such as the perception of the 
floor* Each passive5' consciousness can be subsequently given with 
the quality of being engaged In by an- ego, as In our example, when I 
turn my attention to the perception of the floor so that the table per* 
'Caption is given as "passive” and the floor perception is given as "ac­
tive,." P̂assive" |n no way signifies ‘’receptivity***' Thus, at the pre* 
reflective level* there are phases ©# consciousness that are-retained 
as' that phase of Itself 'which was anticipated and subsequently retain*' 
ed* our phenomenological datum* There is also at the pre-reflective 
'level consciousness constituting sows.phases of itself as having been 
engaged in* or now engaged In*, or anticipated a®, being, engaged In by 
■an ego* In a '.reflective apprehension of pure consciousness* the phases
■ that are "active" are given as having, an egoie quality, and these
■ phases are passively retained in the perpetual, synthesis* "If m  con­
sider the fundamental form §£. syntheses* namely identification*, m  en­
counter it first of all as an alWulfng* eassive.lv flowing synthesis*. 
In. the form of the m m b M M *  *£ l i t e l  M m **1
Thus* we- agree with Sartre that there Is no ego present at the' 
pre-reflective level, and that consciousness does not .make an object 
out of itself at this level* However,-we would want to say that at 
this level there are also some- phases of consciousness constituted' as
Êdmund Husserl* Cartesian fedliatleas. trans* Cairns (The. Hague? 
Î ijhoff* I960), p* 41* see also| f ST* B8*
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Maianson, referto as the. transcendental ego*—m  ©go' that is' not a 
substantivized or reified version of the activity of ©onasionsftess** 
to illustrate what m  mean In the above solution m  -can refer to tm  
experiences in our everyday life that occasionally appearfalthough 
are net. necessarily experiences that everyone does have*
the first coroes about as the result of a feeling of'frustration 
when we think -ourselves i# be entirely unable to communicate to. others 
exactly wbai we are or. are-not*. Apart from' the wanting to convey what 
we have done -of- been, there is at times a feeling that -all. that-we are 
is- not expressed by what we find' in impure -reflection to be our self.
It' Is an awareness that there Is some part, of .our oonsoiousness that 
we can almost grasp, but each time m  do it. slips away# We submit 
'that what we are trying to grasp, in this instance is the transcemfental 
OgO Itself, which Is essentially ungraspable as an object for phenome­
nological reflection. All. we Can find" is the phased of consciousness 
that-are- given as engaged In fey an ego| they have an egofo quality# 
Perhaps some extra-ph©nomeno1ogical method- must fee found which will 
allow- us to grasp-and: elucidate the %g© itself.11 This experience Is 
similarly expressed -fey .Sartre when he speaks of consciousness becoming 
anguished*
There are no more fearrl-efs, no -more limits* .nothing to hide con­
sciousness from Itself*. Then, consciousness, noting what could fee 
called the fatality of Its spontaneity, is -suddenly anguished*
* , it is both a .pure event, of transcendental origin and an ever 
possible accident-of our daily iife.S
'• tw it iw ii-T it iv r r f^ h if f i itT T T ^ ^  i n - i i r i i i i r  i »  i r i ' r r r < » i | « » « im r H # a * >  i i . i i ! , !  ii» .« # iT T *  > i# » c i. - |^ r i* i. . -« l iia.-»i>ii - i m ~ » t i i r i “l i V"  t . ‘- ifi"iW><ii<»-iii»ii J t. iV < V R r'1 i.f-T rn iifr l ii-.innn"
*Hfetar*9oft» m > olt*.» pp. SM&# $$eHre# og. clt.* pp* 102-10S.
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The second experience is what Herbert Spiegelberg 'has called the
* i-am-me* experienced fhisexperieric© Is  quite d is tin c t from the
usual awareness that these acts are ray sets and are being performed fey
the same person that was yesterday,, f# today* m 4 will he tomorrow.
It Is a distloot.awi^^ess* sometimes abrupt and sometimes gradual*
that Is decidedly directed to the. .self as a unique individual* diet ted.
from anything which appears to anyone els# or even itself In Its every
day awareness* 'An Illustration of teis.'experience that is quoted fey
Spiegelberg is m autobiographical fragment of dean Paul Jtlefetef* the
Sermon iomantloisti'
I shall m m f. forget what I .have never revealed to anyone* the 
ptaggmKMrt which accompanied, the birth-of my ©enacleveoess of self ' f̂ lfa t̂oiissteilql and' of which |. m n specify both the place andthe' time* -©he morning* as. a very young child* i 'was standing inot#' front' .door and m » .looking over to' the wood pile on the left* ■when suddenly the Inner vision M am a me* flch tin eln Irifl shot 
down before m  like a flash of lightning from 'the' sky*' and 'ever Since, it .has. remained with me luminously t at that moment my ego 
C.lch) 'had seen Itself for the first time* and.for ever, One can hardly conceive of deceptions of memory in this 'ease* .fine# m  one 
else's reporting could mix additions with' such an aMktfeftfty which 
happened merely in the curtained holy of''holies, of man and. whose novelty alone had lent, permanence to such everyday concomitants,#
hike the first, type- of awareness It# articulation requires one to de­
grade what Is felt if It le to be set down explieitly, Perhaps only a, 
poetical expression .could convey the feel teg that we. afe on the., level 
where our self really resides* What Is- experienced in the. f teaawne*
Ĥerbert Spiegelberg, w0n the ‘ teem-ma» |j^efiene© in Childhood 
and Adolescence** Psuehelsala (Kyoto)* 1951, pp. 13S-14B,
2dean Paul Biehter, Aus deaoPauIs ieben, Samtliche Werke
fieri tel 1852), XXXIV* 26...........
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We can further Ijiysifate what -IMS' solution is that we propose 
by going -through the varioustheories «f gM&eioutite** that we have
examined and pointing out where we feel they mm el mm orfar from 
our solution.' % we have seen,1 In; relation to §&rtfe*§ theory we• S' 
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sea that the unity of m nm im m m s that fa .necessary far vs leveee§* 
alts ■ sets of consciousness as mine is a unity that is ’’passively1* .. 
«ad positionalIv aware of itself as existent and the .same*,' Thus, what
an*©*
a-###
© ' ^ 
s*■*# 
©
I
 
i' ■ m
* 
4
1
 
* 
8
:|
O4̂t:
-«*»
ifS-M
I1i'M5
.1 
f 
+&*■
':«** 
## 
VfcMt • tg
I 
1
£
 ■% 
■w*
n ': «
#*»■ ■ 
£|
f
 
£
G.
I 
,©
#•m
.<#* 
®
 
8
t 
* 
35
» 
£ 
.1
■*& 
«**
s 
1 1
«. 
0
&
 
%
0
I 
V
I
 §
| I %
:4 
S 
| 
“8 
«. 
§
21
• 
«**
I 3 3 I
ioi■Ii
1
I
iI J,*
i
afelt to see the distinction between impure reflection* tNs level at '■ 
which hi 'carried out hid «e#tdt!«gw and pure refl*tl§«* the’ level /it 
s»hieh;hls;.fflsth&#«i«®loal doubting almost lad hitiv* -teihtlt is quite 
close to ear proposal■ in 'hit theory-if .the aatlias eer^tlens- idifeh;
are ai»*tsf t® the -passive s^thesls that fa petitiensl* a synthesis - 
that -QftA he wade iti '%pperei#tidn*v filther icefee nor Hume 
'eeytld find any' experience of 'the type in which they weald'-: 
■have a perception ef'Sh Identical self which it passively synthesized
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